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Article
Falling Short: On Implicit Biases and the
Discrimination of Short Individuals
OMER KIMHI
Socio-psychological research solidly shows that people hold implicit biases
against short individuals. We associate a host of positive qualities to those with
above average height, and we belittle those born a few inches short. These implicit
biases, in turn, lead to outright discrimination. Experiments prove that employers
prefer not to hire or promote short employees and that they do not adequately
compensate them. According to various studies, controlling for other variables,
every inch of height is worth hundreds of dollars in annual income, which is no less
severe than the wage gap associated with gender or racial discrimination.
Given the proportions of height discrimination revealed in this Article, I
examine why it is not legally addressed. How come the federal system and most
states do not view height discrimination as illegal, and why are such discriminatory
practices ignored even by their victims? Using psychological literature, I argue
that the answer lies in the “naming” of this phenomenon. We fail to recognize
height discrimination because it does not fit our mental template of discrimination.
The characteristics we usually associate with discrimination—intentional
behavior, clear harm, specific perpetrator/victim, and specific domain—do not
exist in height discrimination, so we fail to categorize it as such. This Article
explains why, despite the “naming” difficulties, the legal system should not ignore
the widespread heightism phenomenon. Based on the psychological literature, it
suggests ways to deal with it, focusing on the provision of information and on
consciousness raising.
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Falling Short: On Implicit Biases and the
Discrimination of Short Individuals
OMER KIMHI *
“[T]he discrimination in favor of tallness is one of the most blatant and
forgiven prejudices in our society.”1
INTRODUCTION
In his famous (and excellent) song, “Short People,” Randy Newman
depicts a character that despises short people.2 Short people, the character
states, have “little baby legs,” “grubby little fingers,” and “dirty little
minds.”3 They spread lies, no one likes them and in general, we are all better
off without them.4 Newman, of course, did not mean to eradicate all
individuals under 5’7”.5 The song was written in irony, and Newman
actually meant to show the absurdity in racism and prejudices. In fact,
Newman chose to write about short people, particularly because he thought
no one would take him seriously. In an interview about the controversy that
surrounded the song he said: “I had no idea that there was any sensitivity, I
mean, that anyone could believe that anyone was as crazy as [the] character
[singing the song].”6 Indeed, most people, I believe, do not think there is any
bias against short people. Outside Randy Newman’s song, people usually do
not say they “don’t want no short people,”7 and we might find it hard to
believe that someone is denied a job or a promotion just because of their
height. And yet there is ample evidence that proves the contrary.

*
Associate Professor (tenured), Haifa University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Tammy Katsabian, Tamar Harel Ben Shahar, and Yair Sagy for their valuable comments. He also wishes
to thank Saar Ben Zeev for her assistance in the research.
1
John Kenneth Galbraith, Galbraith: Turning Economics to Show Biz, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
May 18, 1977, at 22.
2
RANDY NEWMAN, Short People, on LITTLE CRIMINALS (Warner Bros. 1977)
3
Id. The song’s lyrics are available at Randy Newman Lyrics, AZLYRICS.COM,
https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/randynewman/shortpeople.html (last visited June 19, 2020).
4
Id.
5
Lydia Hutchinson, Happy Birthday, Randy Newman, PERFORMING SONG WRITER (Nov. 28,
2016), http://performingsongwriter.com/randy-newman-songs/.
6
Id.
7
NEWMAN, supra note 2.
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Psychological and sociological literature solidly demonstrates that we
hold implicit biases against short individuals and favor tall ones.8
Unconsciously, we associate a host of positive qualities (not connected to
height) to those blessed with a few additional inches, and we belittle people
born a few inches short—especially men.9 The biases short people suffer
start practically at birth. Show mothers pictures of two young babies, and
they will consistently pick the taller baby as more competent and able.10 Ask
teachers to evaluate their pupils, and they will rate the taller kids as better
than the short ones, even when there is no difference in test scores.11 In
adulthood, height is an important factor in perceived power, and taller
individuals are accorded a higher social status. We believe tall men are
healthier, more intelligent, and more competent than short men, and we
perceive short individuals as less successful, less assertive, and less
leader-like than their taller counterparts.12 Only recently it was reported that
Donald Trump refused to consider Mr. Bob Corker for the position of
Secretary of State due to his height. Mr. Corker is “only” 5’7”, and at this
height, according to President Trump, he cannot serve as the nation’s top
diplomat.13 The association between height and social status is so ingrained
in our minds that when we perceive someone as successful, we
unconsciously add a few inches to his height.14 Experiments show that our

8
LESLIE F. MARTEL & HENRY B. BILLER, STATURE AND STIGMA, THE BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF SHORT MALES 36 (1987).
9
Id.
10
Nancy Eisenberg et al., Sex Differences in the Relationship of Height to Children’s Actual and
Attributed Social and Cognitive Competencies, 11 SEX ROLES 719, 719 (1984).
11
Carolyn Villimez et al., Sex Differences in the Relation of Children’s Height and Weight to
Academic Performance and Others’ Attributions of Competence, 15 SEX ROLES 667, 667 (1986).
12
Nancy M. Blaker et al., The Height Leadership Advantage in Men and Women: Testing
Evolutionary Psychology Predictions About the Perceptions of Tall Leaders, 16 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP REL. 17, 17–18 (2013).
13
Eliza Relman, Trump Reportedly Thought Bob Corker Was Too Short to Be Secretary of State,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-mocks-republican-corker-sizeliddle-2017-10; Peter Baker, For Trump, the Reality Show Has Never Ended, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/politics/trump-corker-feud-tweet-liddle-bob.html. President
Trump’s height biases are also evident from the way he demeans his opponents. He named Senator Marco
Rubio (5’9”) “little Marco,” to put him down during the primaries debate, TANYA S. OSENSKY,
SHORTCHANGED: HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 42 (2017), he called
ABC’s host “little George Stephanopoulos,” Sasha Savitsky, Trump Mocks ‘Little’ George
Stephanopoulos, Doubles Down on ABC Bias Claims, FOX NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2017/08/23/trump-mocks-little-george-stephanopoulosdoubles-down-on-abc-bias-claims.html, and he refers to the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, as “little
rocket man,” Brian Williams, Trump Calls North Korean’s Kim Jong Un ‘Little Rocket Man’, MSNBC
(Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.msnbc.com/brian-williams/watch/trump-calls-north-korean-s-kim-jongun-little-rocket-man-1053213251643.
14
Paul R. Wilson, Perceptual Distortion of Height as a Function of Ascribed Academic Status, 74
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 97 (1968).
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mind has difficulties associating short men with high social status, and so it
corrects the short person’s height to decrease the dissonance.
As a result of these biases, short males suffer from outright
discrimination, which, according to research, is no less severe than gender
or racial discrimination.15 First, employers are reluctant to hire short
applicants.16 Employers perceive taller applicants as more competent
(generally and job-specific), and they reject short applicants even when their
resumes are similar to those of the taller applicants.17 Experiments show that
when given the option most employers hire the taller applicant, and that the
level of stigma concerning the short applicants is higher than the level of
stigma with respect to all “classical” categories of discrimination (gender,
race, religion, etc.).18 Second, when short individuals are accepted to a job,
their chances of promotion are considerably lower than those of their taller
peers.19 Employers do not see short employees as leadership material, and
they fail to give them managerial positions.20 Examining the CEO
population, for example, reveals that the average CEO is taller than the
average American by no less than three inches, and that only 3% of the CEOs
are 5’7” or less (compared to 20% in the general population).21 The same is
true in politics. In the last 122 years there was no shorter than average
President, and height was usually a good predictor of elections’ outcomes.22
Third, and perhaps most staggering, research shows that a person’s income
is directly related to his height.23 Using different databases, researchers
consistently conclude that, controlling for other factors, taller males receive
higher compensation than their shorter peers.24 Every inch of height is equal
to an increase of at least 2.5% in annual salary, and according to some
researchers even more,25 which can amount to thousands of dollars each

15
Nicola Persico et al., The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case
of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019, 1019–20 (2004).
16
See infra notes 81–95 and accompanying text.
17
Jens Agerström, Why Does Height Matter in Hiring?, 52 J. BEHAV. EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 35,
35 (2014).
18
Paula M. Brochu, The Prejudice Paradox (Or Discrimination Is Not Dead): Systematic
Discrimination in Forced Choice Employment Decisions 27–39 (Aug. 4, 2011) (Ph.D. thesis, The
University of Western Ontario) (on file with the Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository).
19
See infra notes 102–28 and accompanying text.
20
Tim Gawley et al., Height, Gender, and Authority Status at Work: Analyses for a National Sample
of Canadian Workers, 60 SEX ROLES 208, 208, 210 (2009).
21
See infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
22
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 129–48 and accompanying text.
24
See id. (citing a previous study that found height increases equated to raises in income).
25
See Jessica Tyrrell et al., Height, Body Mass Index, and Socio-economic Status: Mendelian
Randomisation Study in UK Biobank, 352 BMJ 1, 8 (2016) (discussing evidence of taller stature leading
to higher socioeconomic status).
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year.26 The height premium exists in various countries, and it is comparable
to the premiums associated with race and gender.27
The data about the prevalence and the severity of height discrimination,
which has so far been ignored by the legal scholarship, calls for a legal
analysis. This Article fills this gap in the literature, and reveals a disparity
between the normative analysis and the positive law concerning this issue.
From a normative perspective, I show that the legal and philosophical
justifications given for addressing the classical forms of discrimination
equally apply to height discrimination.28 Height discrimination, I argue,
demeans short people, perpetuates the evolutionary status hierarchies
between short and tall, is morally objectionable, and should be addressed.
From a positive perspective, however, existing law does not adequately deal
with height discrimination. Federal law and the law in most states does not
view height discrimination as an illegal disparate treatment discrimination,
and courts reject claims for discrimination that are based on the plaintiff's
stature.29 Moreover, in the few jurisdictions that have enacted height
discrimination statutes (like Michigan, Washington, D.C., Santa Cruz, or
San Francisco), height discrimination claims are not filed.30 The statute is a
dead letter, and short people do not use it to claim remedies.31 Why then,
despite the prevalence and normative importance of height discrimination,
is the legal system helpless in addressing it? Why, although short people are
evidently discriminated against, is this phenomenon largely ignored?
This Article explains this conundrum using sociological and
psychological literature. The solution, I argue, lies in the “naming” of this
phenomenon—i.e., in people’s ability to recognize harmful experiences they
suffer as related to height discrimination. According to socio-psychological
research, similar to the perception of objects (such as a table or a chair), we
decide whether a certain behavior is discriminatory or not by using a mental
template of discriminatory behavior.32 Our brain holds a kind of prototype
of how discrimination should look, and in order to determine whether a
certain behavior or outcome is discriminatory, we compare the incoming
information about the behavior to the mental discrimination prototype we
have.33 Unfortunately, however, as I elaborately discuss in this Article,
height discrimination does not fit the mental discrimination prototype that
most of us hold. It is usually not intentional; its harm is not very perceptible
26

Persico et al., supra note 15, at 1030 (analyzing incremental increases in height correlated with
increases in wages).
27
See infra notes 129–48 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 161–69 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 213–20 and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes 221–40 and accompanying text.
31
See infra notes 224–43 and accompanying text.
32
See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
33
See infra notes 267–74 and accompanying text.
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and it has an unconventional form, both in terms of perpetrator/victim and
the domain in which it takes place. As a result, short people have difficulties
in attributing the bad outcomes or negative experiences from which they
suffer to height discrimination, which they attribute to other reasons (lack of
talent, character flaws, or misfortune). Thus, claims of height discrimination
are not made, and society does not recognize this grave problem despite its
pervasiveness.34
In order to address the plight of the short-statured, this Article, therefore,
argues that the legal system should focus on the “naming” of height
discrimination. Height discrimination should be recognized as the social
phenomenon that it is, so that people—both short and tall—will be aware of
its existence and will be able to confront it. This Article suggests that the
“naming” of height discrimination should be facilitated through the
provision of information. Employers should provide information on the way
short employees are treated, and the data should be readily available to the
public. Only when awareness of heightism develops will social change
occur.
This Article, I believe, makes several important contributions. First, it
introduces the data on heightism to the legal literature. So far, legal
scholarship failed to notice that height discrimination even exists, and this
Article aims to raise the legal consciousness to this undiscussed
phenomenon. It examines dozens of research studies that undoubtedly prove
the existence of heightism, and it demonstrates the pervasiveness and
severity of this type of prejudice. Second, this Article legally analyzes
heightism, for the first time, from both positive and normative
perspectives.35 It shows that the legal system does not address this type of
discrimination, and argues, using psychological literature, that this is due to
the difficulties in “naming” height discrimination. This argument can be
helpful in understanding not only height discrimination, but also other types
of “non-classic” discrimination (such as weight or appearance-based
discrimination). Third, this Article contributes to the literature on
masculinity and gender. Academic literature and public discussion often
focus on the damages of the “ideal” female body type. We note the societal
“obligation” on women to have a Barbie-like figure, and we warn about the
serious repercussions such unrealistic expectations may have on women and
young girls (frustration, sometimes even psychological damage). There is
ample writing, therefore, on women’s discrimination in this respect, and in

34

See infra notes 277–302 and accompanying text.
Isaac B. Rosenberg wrote about height discrimination before, but his analysis describes this
phenomenon mostly from a positive perspective. He does not go into the normative aspects of height
discrimination, and does not analyze the difficulties in the naming of this phenomenon. See Isaac B.
Rosenberg, Height Discrimination in Employment, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 907, 915.
35
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particular on weight and appearance-based discrimination.36 This Article
demonstrates, however, that a similar phenomenon exists also with respect
to men. Just like society expects females to be thin and fragile, it also expects
males to be tall and strong. Just like society demeans and discriminates
against women who do not meet the “ideal” female figure, it also does so
with respect to men who do not meet the social height expectations. It shows
that women are not the only victims of discrimination as a result of body
stereotyping, and that men may suffer too.
The rest of this Article then proceeds as follows: in Part I, following this
introduction, I present the data on height discrimination. I show its effects
in the employment sphere, and its pervasiveness in our society. In Part II, I
examine the law on height discrimination. This part begins with a normative
analysis that explains why the law should address height discrimination, and
continues with a positive analysis that shows existing law does not
adequately address this problem. In Part III, I show the difficulties in naming
height discrimination, and, in Part IV, I propose an information-based
solution to the naming problem.
I. HEIGHTISM – THE DATA
Social scientists have documented various implicit biases against people
with short stature. A tall individual is perceived to be more competent and
dominant than his shorter peers, and tall people seem more apt for leadership
positions. Natalie Angier, a science journalist for the New York Times,
described the admiration for the tall and the contempt for the short that is
present in our society as follows:
By the simple act of striding into a room, taller than average
men are accorded a host of positive attributes having little or
nothing to do with height: a high IQ, talent, competence,
trustworthiness, even kindness.
And men who are considerably shorter than the average
American guy height of 5-foot-9 1/2? These poor little fellows
are at elevated risk of dropping out of school, drinking heavily,
dating sparsely, getting sick or depressed. . . . Call them
whatever you please, and chances are you won’t get called on

36
See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2010)
(arguing “that discrimination based upon appearance is a significant form of injustice”); see also
Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
57, 76 (2002) (arguing “for extending the protection of antidiscrimination laws” to people who suffer
from being overweight).
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it, for making fun of short men is one of the last acceptable
prejudices.37
The bias against short people is so ingrained in our brains that when we
know someone is successful or in a leadership position we unconsciously
add a few inches to his height.38 Paul Wilson, a social psychologist,
conducted the following experiment.39 A course director invited a guest
speaker to give a talk in front of students.40 The students were divided into
five different groups, and to each group the guest speaker’s academic status
was presented differently.41 To one group he was presented as a regular
student (just like his listeners); to the second, a demonstrator; to the third, a
lecturer; to the fourth, a senior lecturer; and to the fifth, a full professor
highly acclaimed in his field.42 After the lecture was over, the students were
requested to estimate the height of both the speaker and the course director.43
Surprisingly (or not!), whereas the mean estimate of the course director’s
height did not significantly change among the different groups, the mean
estimate of the guest-speaker’s height varied according to his stated
academic status.44 Students who were told the guest speaker is a full
professor thought he was 3.3 inches taller than students who were told he
was a regular student.45
The association of height with positive attributes is true from infancy
through childhood and until adulthood. In one study, 100 mothers were
given a photo of two, nineteen-month-old babies (baby1 and baby2).46 The
two babies closely resembled each other, but the experimenters manipulated
their height.47 In one photo baby1 looked taller, in a second photo baby2
looked taller, and in the third both babies looked the same height.48 After
being assigned one of the three photos, the mothers were asked to evaluate
the babies’ competences, by rating them on several indicators (such as
“being independent,” “obeying rules or instructions,” and “taking care of
37
Natalie Angier, Ideas & Trends; Short Men, Short Shrift. Are Drugs the Answer?, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/22/weekinreview/ideas-trends-short-men-shortshrift-are-drugs-the-answer.html.
38
Wilson, supra note 14, at 99–101. Previous research has also indicated significant relationships
between authority status and perceptual distortion of size. See W.D. Dannenmaier & F. J. Thumin,
Authority Status as a Factor in Perceptual Distortion of Size, 63 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 361, 364 (1964)
(noting a “relationship between authority status and perceptual distortion of size”).
39
See generally Wilson, supra note 14.
40
Id. at 98.
41
Id. at 98–99.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 99–101.
45
Id.
46
Eisenberg et al., supra note 10, at 721.
47
Id.
48
Id.

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 199

7/28/20 10:48 AM

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

728

[Vol. 52:2

his own needs”).49 The experiment showed that the mothers’ perception of a
baby’s competence was directly related to the baby’s height.50 Mothers
consistently picked the taller child in the picture as more able, more
independent, and more assertive, even though all other attributes were the
same.51 This effect was stronger for boys, but existed also for girls.52
The same issue has been studied in regards to children aged five through
53
ten. Teachers (kindergarten to fourth grade) were asked to rate their pupils’
academic competences on a scale of one to seven. The correlation between
the teachers’ evaluations and the children’s height was examined.54 A
positive relation was found to exist between a boy’s height and the teachers’
ratings of his academic abilities.55 Although height was unrelated to the
males’ test score achievements, on average teachers perceived taller boys as
more competent.56 This correlation persisted throughout the academic year,
but was not significant for females (for females, weight was a significant
negative factor).57
A similar study using photographs of male and female subjects, and
optical illusions manipulating the subjects’ heights demonstrates the same
association in regards to adults.58 Some participants were presented with
photos of tall subjects (both a tall man and a tall woman), while others saw
short subjects (both a short man and a short woman).59 The participants were
then asked to report their level of agreement with statements, such as “[t]his
person looks intelligent,” “[t]his person looks like a leader,” and so on.60
The results show that when a male subject looks taller, others perceive him
as healthier, more dominant, and intelligent.61 A taller woman, on the other
hand, does not seem healthier or more dominant, but she does seem more
intelligent.62 The researchers concluded that taller individuals, especially
males, are perceived as having leader-like qualities, and thus they have an
advantage when competing for leadership positions.63 Leslie Martel and
Henry Biller, who wrote a book on the biological, psychological, and social
49

Id. at 721–22, 724–25 (emphasis added).
Id. at 723.
51
Id. at 723–26.
52
Id. at 723, 726–28, 730–33.
53
Villimez et al., supra note 11, at 669–71.
54
Id. at 669–72.
55
Id. at 677, 679–80.
56
Id. at 675–77, 679–80.
57
Id. at 672, 674–80; see also Karlsson Roth & Nancy Eisenberg, The Effects of Children’s Height
on Teachers’ Attributions of Competence, 143 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 45, 50 (1983) (showing similar
result among teachers in how they assigned punishments for hypothetical transgressions).
58
Blaker et al., supra note 12, at 19–21, 23–25.
59
Id. at 20–21.
60
Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
61
Id. at 23.
62
Id. at 23–24.
63
Id.
50
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effects of the male stature, summarize the literature on the social stigma of
height as follows: “All in all, the research solidly demonstrates that height
is a very important factor in perceived power and social status. The taller
individual is able to attain a more commanding position in the eyes of others,
benefiting from the positive attributions based on his height.”64
Evidence of the social stigma against the short statured exists not only
in scholarly writings, but also in our culture—especially pop-culture. Tanya
Osensky points out, that whereas tall (usually thin) characters play leading
roles of people worthy of success (in romance or finance), short (often fat)
characters are given the role of the friend or the sidekick.65 Depictions of
short characters are often the comic relief, and are the subject of jokes and
mockery. For example, Carlton Banks (as opposed to Will Smith) in the
Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, Danny DeVito’s characters in Taxi (Louie) and
Twins (Vincent Benedict), or even George Costanza in Seinfeld.66 Short
actors who manage to get leading roles try to conceal their height,67 as if
their small size is something to be ashamed of. There are hardly any short
superheroes,68 and even when there is one, such as Wolverine,69 movie
executives prefer to cast a tall actor to play the role (Hugh Jackman, 6’3”,
plays Wolverine, 5’3” in the original comics).70
The association between height and positive qualities is even embedded
in our language. Idioms containing the adjective “short” are usually
pejorative, while idioms referring to a tall or big stature are usually

64

MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 8, at 36 (emphasis added).
OSENSKY, supra note 13, at 29–30.
66
Id. at 30. A possible exception is Tyrion Lannister, of Game of Thrones. Id. at 29–30. Unlike the
short individuals discussed in the article, though, Tyrion Lannister suffers from Dwarfism—a disability.
It is interesting to note that one of the few short heroes is actually not short, but disabled. The book and
the series address the disability. When falsely accused of murdering his nephew, Tyrion Lannister says
in his trial, “I’m guilty of a far more monstrous crime: I’m guilty of being a dwarf! . . . I’ve been on trial
for that my entire life!” Tyrion Lannister, FANDOM: GAME OF THRONES WIKI,
https://gameofthrones.fandom.com/wiki/Tyrion_Lannister (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
67
See, e.g., Morgan Baila, 13 Things That Are Taller Than Tom Cruise, REFINERY29 (July 5, 2016,
12:15 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2016/07/115257/how-tall-is-tom-cruise-height (noting that Tom
Cruise is “known to often use smoke and mirrors (and heeled shoes) to trick the public in photos and
movie scenes” to appear taller). See also Mara Siegler, How ‘GMA’ Hides George Stephanopoulos’
‘Little-Boyish Mini-Legs’, PAGE SIX (July 12, 2017, 9:42 PM), https://pagesix.com/2017/07/12/howgma-hides-george-stephanopoulos-little-boyish-mini-legs/ (describing the use of a silver panel across the
front of the anchor desk to hide Good Morning America anchor George Stephanopoulos’s height).
68
Marvel Heroes Height Comparison Chart, IMGUR, https://imgur.com/a/hJHop#kz0WOz1 (last
visited June 17, 2020).
69
Wolverine, MARVEL, https://www.marvel.com/characters/wolverine-james-howlett/in-comics
(last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
70
See, e.g., Terri Schwartz, Hugh Jackman Couldn’t Turn Down X-Men: Days of Future Past, CBR
(Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.cbr.com/hugh-jackman-couldnt-turn-down-x-men-days-of-future-past/
(explaining how director Bryan Singer chose Hugh Jackman to play Wolverine, despite the height
difference).
65
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positive.71 We are disadvantaged when we “come up short” or “fall short,”
but it is virtuous when we are “head and shoulders above the rest,” when we
“stand tall,” or when we come out “the bigger person.”72 Language, as we
know, both reflects and creates reality, and in this reality being small is a
shortcoming (pun intended).73
This perception, it seems, has biological/evolutionary origins. Gregg
Murray and J. David Schmitz explain that the human species has lived in
hunter-gatherer tribes of 5 to 150 people for more than 99% of its
existence.74 Within these tribes, members had to fight with each other over
scarce resources, and the larger-sized males usually prevailed and were
regarded as the leaders of the group.75 Although today human conflicts are
rarely resolved through physical bodily contact (so size is far less important),
the association between size and status remains as an evolutionary remnant.
Taller males are automatically perceived as leaders and are awarded with
leadership qualities, such as strength, health, intelligence, and dominance.76
Blaker and an Vugt compare this perception to the behaviors in the animal
kingdom.77 They maintain that the human species, similar to other species,
tends to idealize the largest members of the group because the largest
members have better chances to win fights over food, territory, and
females.78 Although physical strength is no longer relevant for humans’
current status hierarchies (now money is much more important), the
evolutionary perceptions are still there.79
These evolutionary conceptions, in turn, lead to outright discrimination
against short individuals (“heightism”). The research on this subject looks at
both the social and employment spheres,80 but for the purposes of this
71

OSENSKY, supra note 13, at 8.
See also id. (providing other examples of such idioms).
73
See Lera Boroditsky, Does Language Shape Thought?: Mandarin and English Speakers’
Conceptions of Time, 43 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 2–3, 18–20 (2001) (discussing how language shapes
thoughts and affects how we think about the world).
74
Gregg R. Murray & J. David Schmitz, Caveman Politics: Evolutionary Leadership Preferences
and Physical Stature, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 1215, 1220 (2011).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Nancy M. Blaker & Mark van Vugt, The Status-Size Hypothesis: How Cues of Physical Size and
Social Status Influence Each Other, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL STATUS 119, 119–20, 124–25 (J. T.
Cheng et al. eds., 2014).
78
Id. at 120–21, 124–25, 129–30.
79
Id. at 119, 121–22, 125, 129–31, 133. See also Blaker et al., supra note 12, at 18–19, 23–24
(finding that height correlates with perceptions of leadership, in line with these evolutionary principles).
80
See, e.g., John Stuart Gillis & Walter E. Avis, The Male-Taller Norm in Mate Selection, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 396, 399 (1980) (finding that women prefer taller men and men
prefer shorter women in the social sphere). Gillis and Avis examined the relative height of males and
females in 720 random couples (data collected from bank account application forms that indicate the
height of the applicants). Id. at 397–98. They find that out of 720 couples, there was only one couple
where the man was shorter than the woman. Id. at 399. In a later study from 1996, Pierce used a
meta-analysis framework to examine the taller male assumption. Charles A. Pierce, Body Height and
72
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Article, I focus solely on employment. I describe the biases against short
people in hiring, promotions, and compensation, and show that heightism is
no less severe, perhaps even more so, than race and gender discrimination.
1. Hiring: The discrimination against short people in the employment
sphere starts in hiring decisions. In a seminal research study from 1969,
David Kurtz asked recruiters (human resource experts) to choose between
two possible applicants for a sales position: short and tall.81 The two
applicants were identical in their qualities and credentials, but one was above
5’11” (180 cm) and the other was below 5’7” (170 cm).82 According to
Kurtz’s findings, 72% of the recruiters preferred the tall applicant and the
rest had no preference.83 Only one recruiter favored the short applicant, even
though there is no obvious connection between a person’s height and his
ability to secure a sale.84
Later studies reach similar conclusions. Carl Bonuso, for example, sent
fake resumes to 585 randomly selected superintendents in New York.85 The
resumes were similar to each other, except that they represented six different
Romantic Attraction: A Meta-Analytic Test of the Male-Taller Norm, 24 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY
143 (1996). He examined the results of eight different studies (not including the Gillis & Avis study
above), which in total looked at the preferences of 727 males and 922 females, and estimated the
importance of height for both sexes. Id. at 146. According to Pierce’s findings, not all studies reached
the same conclusion. Id. at 144, 146–47; see also William Graziano, Thomas Brothen & Ellen Berscheid,
Height and Attraction: Do Men and Woman See Eye-to-Eye?, 46 J. PERSONALITY 128, 133–34 (1978)
(demonstrating a correlation between male height and perceived attractiveness). Females prefer to be
romantically involved with males who are as tall or taller than themselves, and males prefer to be
romantically involved with females who are the same height or shorter than themselves. Pierce, supra,
at 146–47. More recent studies reach similar conclusions. Yancey and Emerson used two data sources to
investigate the role of height in dating decisions: Yahoo! dating personal advertisements and answers to
open ended questions in an online survey. George Yancey & Michael O. Emerson, Does Height Matter?
An Examination of Height Preferences in Romantic Coupling, 37 J. FAM. ISSUES 53, 57–62 (2014). The
Yahoo! data shows the importance of height in mate selection (height was important to both sexes, but
more important to females than to males). Id. at 62. The answers from the online survey indicate that the
reason for such preferences is mainly societal expectations or gender stereotypes. Id. at 69. Taller men
are less likely to be childless than shorter ones. Daniel Nettle, Height and Reproductive Success in a
Cohort of British Men, 13 HUM. NATURE 473, 482 (2002) (reporting that tall men are more successful in
attracting long-term mates and less probable to remain without a long-term partner). Id. at 487. Sohn
argues that not only is height an important factor in finding a mate, but it is also an important factor in
long-term happiness. Kitae Sohn, Does a Taller Husband Make His Wife Happier?, 91 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 14, 18 (2016). Using a sample of 7850 Indonesian wives, he finds that a
greater height difference in a couple is positively related to the wife’s happiness. Id. This relationship
gradually weakened over time and entirely dissipated by eighteen years of marital duration. Id. at 18–19.
Thus, discrimination against short individuals also appears in the social sphere, but I focus on
employment.
81
David L. Kurtz, Physical Appearance and Stature: Important Variables in Sales Recruiting, 48
PERSONNEL J. 981, 982–83 (1969).
82
Id. at 982.
83
Id. at 983.
84
Id.
85
Carl A. Bonuso, Body Type: A Factor in the Hiring of School Leaders, 64 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
374, 374 (1983).
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applicant body types (short/tall, ideal weight/overweight, and so on).86 The
superintendents were asked to rate the job applicants, and the answers
revealed a significant height and weight bias.87 Tall applicants, male and
female, were rated significantly better than their shorter peers, and the
superintendents were more willing to hire them.88 A more recent study from
2014 aimed to probe deeper into the motives of job recruiters.89 Here, the
experimenters were interested not only in the recruiters’ willingness to hire
an applicant, but also in their perception of more general qualities (such as
warmth, general competence, job competence, health, attractiveness, and so
on).90 Using height manipulation in the applicant’s C.V., they showed that
height significantly influenced the recruiters’ evaluations.91 When an
applicant appeared taller on the C.V., he also received significantly higher
marks with respect to general competence, physical health, and job
competence.92 In addition, and as a result of the better evaluations of the
general qualities, recruiters were much more willing to hire the tall
applicants for specific jobs.93 This occurred despite the relatively small
height manipulation created by the researchers—a difference of just 3.1
inches between the tall and the short applicants.94 Wayne Hensley and Robin
Cooper reviewed the psychological literature and reached the following
conclusion: “This review undoubtedly discouraged many of the ‘taller is
better’ proponents. The evidence, we think, is rather clear. While taller than
average persons may enjoy advantages in obtaining positions, their job
performance is no better than that of their shorter colleagues.”95
Paula Brochu shows that the effect of height on hiring decisions is even
greater than the effect of the applicant’s gender, age, sexual orientation, or
religion.96 She presented participants with eight different scenarios in which
participants had to decide between two job applicants.97 The applicants were
similarly qualified and equally competent in all respects, except for one
dimension that was different in each scenario.98 In one scenario, the
applicants were of different genders (one male applicant, one female); in
86

Each resume included a mention of the applicant’s height and weight. Id. A photograph of the
applicant was also attached. Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Agerström, supra note 17, at 35.
90
Id. at 37.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 38.
95
Wayne E. Hensley & Robin Cooper, Height and Occupational Success: A Review and Critique,
60 PSYCHOL. REP. 843, 847 (1987) (emphasis added).
96
Brochu, supra note 18, at 21.
97
Id. at 16–17.
98
Id. at 17.
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another they were different ages (young/old), and so on (with respect to
ethnicity, religion, nationality, height, weight, and sexual orientation).99 She
then compared how many stigmatized applicants were accepted in each
scenario.100 According to her results, the percentage of short applicants
chosen to be hired by the experiment’s participants was lower than all other
stigmatized candidates (female, black, old, homosexual, Muslim, etc.),
except overweight candidates.101 This indicates that the level of stigma
concerning height is higher than the “classical” categories of discrimination.
2. Promotion to authority-managerial position: But the bias against short
people does not stop when they are hired. After being hired, short employees
are promoted less, and they are much less likely to attain leadership positions
than their taller colleagues.102 Malcolm Gladwell surveyed the height of
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies.103 He found that the average CEO is taller
than the average American male by about three inches.104 Only 14.5% of
American males are six feet or taller, as compared to 58% of CEOs.105 Only
3.9% of American males are six feet two or taller, while a whopping third of
the CEOs (almost tenfold) reach this height.106 Another survey looked at the
short end of the tale: the Economist reports that a measly 3% of the CEOs
are five feet seven inches or under,107 compared to 20% of the general male
population.108 The same is true with regard to American Presidents.109
Timothy Judge and Daniel Cable noted that a shorter-than-average President

99

Id.
Id. at 17–18, 21. In each scenario one applicant had (what Brochu refers to as) a “stigmatized”
quality (old/short/Muslim), and the other had a non-stigmatized quality (young/tall/Christian/etc.). Id. at
17.
101
Id. at 21.
102
See Erik Lindqvist, Height and Leadership, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1191, 1191 (2012) (“A
robust finding in the social sciences is that tall men are more likely to attain leadership positions than
shorter men.”); Melvyn R.W. Hamstra, ‘Big’ Men: Male Leaders’ Height Positively Relates to
Followers’ Perception of Charisma, 56 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 190, 190 (2014)
(“Physical height substantially affects individuals’ success in society, predicting outcomes such as higher
salary and increased likelihood of occupying leadership positions.” (citation omitted)).
103
MALCOLM G LADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 86–87 (2005).
104
Id. Whereas the average American male is five foot nine inches tall, the average CEO is a bit
less than six feet tall. Id.
105
Id. at 87.
106
Id. See also Renée Adams et al., Are CEOs Born Leaders? Lessons from Traits of a Million
Individuals, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 392, 393 (2018) (reporting how Swedish CEOs tend to be taller than
average).
107
Short Guys Finish Last, 337 ECONOMIST 19, 21 (1995) [hereinafter ECONOMIST].
108
The data regarding the general population is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 136 tbl.205 (2011),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed/tables/11s0205.pdf.
109
Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect of Physical Height on Workplace Success and
Income: Preliminary Test of a Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 428, 428 (2004).
100
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has not been elected in the United States since 1896.110 Gert Stulp and his
team, after conducting an exhaustive analysis of this issue, concluded that
on average, Presidents are 7.23 centimeter and losing presidential candidates
6.95 centimeters taller than the average Caucasian American male.111 In
recent elections, the taller of the two candidates was also more likely to win,
and in general, taller candidates usually receive the majority of popular
votes.112 Studies suggest that in recent times, height has become even more
important in presidential politics, probably due to broader media
exposure.113
The correlation between height and leadership positions, however, does
not apply solely to top executives or to presidential candidates. Research
shows that chances to achieve an authority position of any kind are
significantly associated with height.114 Tuvia Melamed and Nicholas
Bozionelos studied the relationship between height and managerial
promotion in 132 managers from the British Civil Service.115 Their analysis
suggests that the rate of promotion is positively correlated with the
employees’ height, even when the effect of personality profiles is taken into
account.116 Judge and Cable conducted a meta-analysis of no less than
forty-four research studies that examined the correlation between height and
various indicators of success, such as leadership, earnings, income, and
status.117 After analyzing the data, they concluded, based on all forty-four
studies, that height has a corrected correlation coefficient of 0.26 across all
leadership criteria, and that height is positively related to males’ (as opposed
to females’) chances of career success.118 A subsequent research conducted
by Gawley and others has examined the correlation between height and
authority status in the workplace using a sample of 4025 full-time Canadian
employees (2210 males and 1815 females).119 They developed seven
alternative measures of authority statuses (such as, the level of management,
employee supervision, number of employees supervised and so on), and they
110
Id.; see also Gert Stulp et al., Tall Claims? Sense and Nonsense About the Importance of Height
of US Presidents, 24 LEADERSHIP Q. 159, 167 (2013) (citing to Judge & Cable as part of their study)
[hereinafter Stulp et al., Tall Claims?].
111
Stulp et al., Tall Claims?, supra note 110, at 164.
112
Id. at 162–63.
113
Id. at 168. Regarding elections in Canada, see Philip A. Higham & D. William Carment, The
Rise and Fall of Politicians: The Judged Heights of Broadbent, Mulroney and Turner Before and After
the 1988 Canadian Federal Election, 24 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 404, 404 (1992).
114
See Tuvia Melamed & Nicholas Bozionelos, Managerial Promotion and Height, 71 PSYCHOL.
REP. 587, 587 (1992) (citing studies that found positive associations between height and authority
positions).
115
Id. at 589.
116
Id. at 592.
117
Judge & Cable, supra note 109, at 431–33.
118
Id. at 432–33.
119
Tim Gawley et al., Height, Gender, and Authority Status at Work: Analyses for a National
Sample of Canadian Workers, 60 SEX ROLES 208, 213 (2009).
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surveyed the height of employees holding authority status vis-à-vis the
height of employees who did not.120 For male employees, they found a
significant difference in the average heights in the two groups, and this
applies to every one of the different authority status definitions they
suggested.121 This difference was significant and robust even after
controlling for various other factors (such as an employee’s education, social
background, and other socioeconomic factors).122
Studies conducted with respect to specific professions also reveal
interesting results. Wayne Hensley, for example, examined the importance
of height in academia.123 His findings show that the average academic is
taller than the average American, and that the height difference varies
according to academic rank.124 Hensley and Stulp conducted a height study
with respect to football referees.125 They revealed that in both the French
League and in the 2010 international World Cup, referees who had an
authority role were on average taller than their assistants, who merely had
an advisory role.126 Taller referees were assigned to more prestigious games
(matches in which the visiting team had a higher ranking), suggesting that
the height of the referee was also associated with his perceived
competence.127 Both Hensley and Stulp separately concluded that height is
correlated with an employee’s ability to secure an authority position.128
3. Height and Income: The effect height has on career success and
promotion can explain the connection between height and income. Multiple
studies from several countries show that every inch of height is worth
hundreds of dollars in yearly income.129
120

Id.
Id. at 215.
122
Id. For a study investigating the correlation between the level of corporate employees and their
status positions at work, see Donald B. Egolf & Lloyd E. Corder, Height Differences of Low and High
Job Status, Female and Male Corporate Employees, 24 SEX ROLES 365 (1991).
123
Wayne E. Hensley, Height as a Measure of Success in Academe, 30 PSYCHOLOGY 40, 41–42
(1993).
124
Id. at 42.
125
Gert Stulp et al., High and Mighty: Height Increases Authority in Professional Refereeing, 10
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 588, 588 (2012).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. See also Hensley, supra note 123, at 40 (“The perception seems to exist that taller individuals
are somehow more capable, able or competent; consequently, this perception leads to taller persons being
disproportionately selected for jobs.”). With respect to coal miners in India, see Soumyananda Dinda et
al., Height, Weight and Earnings Among Coalminers in India, 4 ECON. & HUM. BIOLOGY 342 (2006);
with respect to MBA students, see Irene Hanson Frieze et al., Perceived and Actual Discrimination in
the Salaries of Male and Female Managers, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 46, 62–64 (1990).
129
See Anne Case & Christina Paxson, Stature and Status: Height, Ability, and Labor Market
Outcomes, 116 J. POL. ECON. 499, 499 (2008) (“It has long been recognized that taller adults hold jobs
of higher status and, on average, earn more than other workers.”); Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and
Economic Consequences of Overweight in Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1008, 1011 (1993) (“Height also predicted socioeconomic characteristics among men. Among women,
121
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Persico and others have examined the relationship between height and
wages both in Britain and in the United States.130 Using different
databases,131 they explore how much height adds to a person’s income, when
other factors, such as gender, race, education, and socio-economic
background, are controlled for (what they call “the height premium”).132
They concluded that in Britain “every additional inch of adult height is
associated with an increase in wages of 2.7 percent,” and in the United States
an increase of 2.5% in wages.133 Measured in dollars, this amounts to $756
in Britain (as per 1991 full-time annual wages) and $820 in the United States
(as per 1996 full time annual wages) for every inch of height.134 Persico and
his team maintain that the height premium is comparable to the premiums
associated with race and gender. 135 Thus, a wage gap between two otherwise
similar individuals with a height difference of six to eight inches is similar
to the wage gap between Caucasians and African-American males—i.e., a
15% gap.136 Anna Case and Christina Paxson used the same databases but
with a much larger sample (4860 observations versus 1617).137 They arrived
at similar results, although their explanation to “heightism” is different.138
Using a different data set gathered from the U.K. BioBank, Jessica
Tyrell and her team find an even greater height premium.139 Their data set
includes both observable height and genetic information of more than
100,000 British individuals (Caucasians), and calculates the correlation
between height and genetic information with several socioeconomic
measures including annual income.140 According to their findings, every
this variable had little independent value in predicting subsequent characteristics after we controlled for
base-line variables. Among men, however, a 30-cm (12 in.) reduction in height was independently
associated with a 10 percent increase in the prevalence of poverty. . . .”).
130
Persico et al., supra note 15, at 1019.
131
For Britain, they used data from Britain’s National Child Development Survey (NCDS) and for
the United States they used data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). These
databases contain measures of height at different ages (which, as will be explained further on, is important
for their research) and wages. Id. at 1021.
132
Id. at 1020.
133
Id. at 1030 (emphasis added). After controlling also for family characteristics (including parents’
education, occupation status, and the number of siblings), the coefficients of wages on adult height are
reduced to 2.2 percent in Britain and 1.8 percent in the United States. Id. at 1021.
134
Id. at 1030.
135
Id. at 1020.
136
Id. at 1049.
137
Case & Paxson, supra note 129, at 528.
138
Id. at 499; Persico et al., supra 15, at 1024. Both Persico and Case and Paxson argue that the
wage difference reflects qualities that tall people possess and are rewarded in the labor market. However,
whereas Persico and others associate the difference to non-cognitive abilities (namely—social dominance
and self-esteem), Case and Paxson associate the differences to cognitive abilities. Case and Paxson show
that taller children have higher than average cognitive abilities, and that these test scores explain a large
portion of the height premium in earnings.
139
Tyrrell et al., supra note 25, at 1.
140
Id.
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inch in actual (observable) height leads to a £1130 increase in annual
income.141 Using the genetic analysis, they try to assess the source of this
difference, and they conclude that the height premium is a result of a mixture
of direct causal effects and other factors that the study did not fully consider,
such as self-esteem, stigma, and increased intelligence.142 They also find that
the correlation between height and income for males is much stronger than
for females.143
Studies in additional countries also show the existence of a height
premium in income. Petter Lundborg and his co-authors, for example, reach
a similar conclusion about the correlation between height and salary with
respect to Sweden.144 According to their findings, based on a sample of
145,210 individuals, in Sweden 3.9 inches of height (10 cm) adds a 6%
premium to an individual’s wages.145 This is a somewhat lower premium
when compared to the 10% premium (for four inches of height) observed by
Persico and his team, but the researchers explain that this is due to the narrow
wage distribution (or relative equality in wages) that exists in Sweden. They
note that in all three countries the return on four inches of height corresponds
to the return on one additional year of schooling—about 10% in the United
States and U.K. and about 6% in Sweden.146 In other words, in order to earn
the same wages, a man shorter than his counterpart by four inches would
have to obtain, and pay for, an additional year of education. Hübler
examined the height premium in Germany, finding the premium at 0.65% of
the wages for every inch of height, but he also observed that the connection

141

Id.
Id. at 8.
143
Id. See also Tuvia Melamed, Correlates of Physical Features: Some Gender Differences, 17
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 689, 689 (1994) (examining the effect of height and body
mass on personality and salary for British employees, finding a stronger correlation for men than
women).
144
Petter Lundborg et al., Height and Earnings: The Role of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skills, 49
J. HUM. RESOURCES 141, 141 (2014).
145
Id. at 150, 161–63.
146
See id. at 163 (noting “that the association between height and paycheck in the three countries
(wages in the United States, United Kingdom and earnings in Sweden) corresponds to the return to one
additional year of schooling in the respective countries—about 10 percent in the United States and United
Kingdom . . . and 6 percent in Sweden (using the data explored in this study). Hence, the height-earnings
association in Sweden, though somewhat lower than the wage premiums in the United States and United
Kingdom, is still substantial”). See also Olaf Hübler, The Nonlinear Link Between Height and Wages in
Germany, 1985–2004, 7 ECON. & HUM. BIOLOGY 191, 197 (2009) (describing different ways to interpret
the “maximum height effect . . . experienced by moderately tall men at 191 cm and moderately short
women at 160 cm. The results of the latter are sensitive to the modelling of height effects. This pattern
is due not only to endowment differences but also to unobserved factors related to productivity and
discrimination”); Guido Heineck, Up in the Skies? The Relationship Between Body Height and Earnings
in Germany, 19 LABOUR 469, 477 (2005) (describing that although findings did not indicate wage
differences based on height for female workers and male East German workers, there is a “wage
premium” for male workers of a certain stature from West Germany).
142
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was non-linear.147 He notes that the maximum height effect is achieved when
a man is 3.9 inches above the average (in Germany, 6’3”), and then the
premium slides downwards.148 This corresponds with Gladwell finding that
a large number of the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are taller than the
5’9” American male average.149
It is interesting to compare the wage gap caused by height differences to
the wage gap caused by gender differences. According to the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, as of January 2016, a woman earns on average 82.5 cents
per every dollar a man does.150 This is a significant wage gap—comparable
to the height premium gained by being seven to nine inches taller (between
two Caucasian males). However, looking more closely at the gender wage
gap reveals a more nuanced picture. The gender wage gap varies widely
between professions. In some professions (law, for example), the gap is
extremely wide, whereas in other professions (construction or administrative
work, for example) the gap is relatively small.151 Second, the gender wage
gap varies significantly according to marital status and the number of
children. Married women with children under eighteen earn 80% of their
male counterparts, while unmarried women152 with no children earn 94% of
their male counterparts.153 This implies that other factors, besides employer
discrimination per se, are at play in the gender wage gap—mainly the
relative roles women and men serve in our (patriarchal) society.154
Height discrimination, on the other hand, is more direct and blunter.
Heightism cannot be systematically reasoned through short people’s choices
of certain professions, or because short employees devote less time to their
147

Hübler, supra note 146, at 197, 199.
Id. at 194.
149
GLADWELL, supra note 103, at 86–87.
150
Women’s Earnings 83 Percent of Men’s, But Vary By Occupation, U.S. B UREAU LAB. STAT.:
ECON. DAILY (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/womens-earnings-83-percent-ofmens-but-vary-by-occupation.htm.
151
Id.
152
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT NO. 1058, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS
IN 2014, at 30 (2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/archive/highlights-ofwomens-earnings-in-2014.pdf (noting this “[i]ncludes never-married, divorced, separated, and widowed
persons”).
153
Id. See Andres Erosa et al., A Quantitative Theory of the Gender Gap in Wages, 85 EUR. ECON.
REV. 165, 184 (2016) (measuring “how much of the gender wage gap . . . is due to the fact that working
hours are lower for women than for men” through “a quantitative theory of fertility, labor supply, and
human capital accumulation decisions to measure gender differences in human capital investments over
the life cycle”).
154
Some may argue that a patriarchal society holds women back, Uri Gneezy et al., Gender
Differences in Competition: Evidence From a Matrilineal and Patriarchal Society, 77 ECONOMETRICA
1637, 1638–39 (2009), others might say that women spend more time than men with their children, even
at the expense of their careers, Lyn Craig, Does Father Care Mean Fathers Share?: A Comparison of
How Mothers and Fathers in Intact Families Spend Time with Children, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 259, 259
(2006). I do not aim to assess the causes of the gender wage gap, but I do suggest they are complex.
148
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careers.155 It originates from perceptions that associate height with positive
qualities (such as leadership, dominance, health, or intelligence) and that
denote inferior qualities to short individuals.156
Despite the evolutionary source of these biased perceptions, the fact that
they are still prevalent in today’s society causes height discrimination. Short
employees are misjudged due to a trait over which they have no control, and
their qualities and performance in the job are sometimes underestimated.157
As the empirical research suggests, they are discriminated against no less
than women or racial minorities.
II. HEIGHTISM – THE LAW
The psychological and sociological research on the prevalence of height
discrimination illuminates a legal question: How does the legal system
respond to this type of discrimination? In this Part, I aim to explore whether
the law provides an adequate response to such heightism.158 Before
examining the positive anti-discrimination law, however, I begin with a
normative inquiry: Should the legal system be concerned with heightism at
all? I examine the justifications for addressing height discrimination, and
argue that the law cannot ignore this phenomenon.
A. Why Addressing Height Discrimination Is Important
The justifications for addressing height discrimination, I believe, are
similar to the justifications for addressing other forms of discrimination.
Simply put, if there are good reasons to prohibit discrimination against
women, racial minorities, or religious groups, there are also good reasons to
prohibit discrimination against short individuals. In order to explain why
height discrimination should be addressed, I look at the literature justifying
general anti-discrimination legislation. Various scholars explain why
discrimination is immoral,159 and I apply their reasoning to the specific case
155
Judge & Cable, supra note 109, at 433–39 (showing statistics that explain extent of height
discrimination does not significantly change among professions, although the gap does tend to be larger
in social-interaction professions).
156
Judge & Cable, supra note 109, at 428–29.
157
Id.
158
With regard to gender-based discrimination, as early as 1971 the Supreme Court stated “the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex.” Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). In connection with
the discrimination of African Americans, the Supreme Court established that “[i]f an employment
practice which operates to exclude . . . cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
159
See, e.g., John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
423, 427 (2002) (stating the article’s purpose “to determine both what makes discrimination morally
objectionable and the circumstances under which it is appropriate for the state to suppress such morally
objectionable discrimination”).
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of height discrimination. Note that I do not aim to fully analyze the literature
on the justifications of anti-discrimination. The literature on the subject is
vast, and it is not within the scope of this Article to discuss it in depth. I only
touch upon some of the main arguments given to justify anti-discrimination
policies—individual equality, group equality, and dignity—and show their
relevancy with heightism.
Perhaps the most intuitive justification to the prohibition of
discrimination is the concept of individual equality.160 Equality, according
to this view, requires that any differentiation made among individuals will
be justified by the individuals’ ability to serve the aims being sought. Thus,
if individuals are distinguished on the basis of characteristics irrelevant to
the tasks they are supposed to perform, the act of differentiation becomes
immoral.161 It is no longer meritocratic, and it offends the liberal principle
of equal opportunity. As a corollary, if we reject someone for a job
application or give her smaller compensation based on the fact that she is a
woman, an African American, or short statured, our actions are
objectionable and should be disqualified.162
Another approach to justifying discrimination focuses not on the
individual, but rather on group equality. Owen Fiss has argued that the
anti-discrimination principle should not be understood as promoting
individual rights, but rather as a tool for advancing underprivileged social
groups.163 The purpose of anti-discrimination law, according to his view, is
to prohibit practices that aggravate existing class hierarchies in our society,
redistribute wealth, and promote substantive equality.164 Correspondingly,
160

Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion, 66 MOD. L. REV. 16, 18 (2003).
Hasnas, supra note 159, at 431–33.
162
A separate, albeit connected argument in favor of anti-discrimination policies, concerns the
Rawlsian principles of liberalism. Elizabeth Kristen explains that Rawls warned that “accidents of natural
endowment” should not be used to achieve economic advantages. Justice, she argues, mandates that
society will not deprive those who start with less favorable characteristics (also bodily characteristics),
because behind a “veil of ignorance” people will be inclined to choose rules that will treat everyone
equally. Kristen, supra note 36, at 76.
163
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 148
(1976) (defining a social group as having two conditions: (1) it is an entity—i.e. it has a distinct existence
apart from its members, and you can talk about the group without reference to the particular individuals
who happen to be its members at any one moment; and (2) there is inter-dependence between the group
and its members). The identity and wellbeing of the members of the group and the identity and wellbeing
of the group are linked. This definition applies also for short people. The group of short people exists
apart from its members, because you can talk about short people, just as Randy Newman does in his
song, NEWMAN supra note 2, or as the Economist does in its article, ECONOMIST supra note 107, without
reference to any particular individual. Height is doubtless a part of people’s identity, and when short
stature is made fun of, short individuals as a group are offended. See Larry Alexander, What Makes
Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149,
151 (1992) (asking “[w]hat explains and justifies the distinctions we make between discrimination that
is wrongful and discrimination that is not,” and arguing “that answering this question is much more
difficult than most people assume”).
164
Fiss, supra note 163, at 152–57, 166.
161
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Cass Sunstein offers the “anti-caste principle.”165 According to this
principle, irrelevant differences between social groups, even when highly
visible, should not turn into systematic social disadvantages.166 Such
disadvantages trigger insults to self-respect and prevent the underprivileged
groups from developing and realizing their full capacity.167
And yet a third approach to discrimination focuses on the concept of
dignity (moral worth). This approach assumes that all individuals have an
equal moral worth,168 and that every person has a basic right to be treated
with dignity.169 When people are distinguished in a way that denies or
violates their dignity, they are treated as lesser beings, and this is
inconsistent with the basic premise of moral worth.170 Deborah Hellman,
who developed the concept of dignity as a justification for
anti-discrimination
laws,
explains
that
whether
a
certain
classification/distinction is demeaning, and therefore whether it is immoral,
depends on cultural perceptions and social context.171 She argues that it is
not demeaning, and hence permissible, for an employer to decide not to hire
people whose last name begins with the letter “A” because there is no
sociocultural background and history of disenfranchising the letter “A.”172 It
is demeaning, however, to apply the same policy towards women or African
Americans because the cultural backdrop on the basis of which such
behaviors take place is charged with a history of humiliation and a social
stigma against women and blacks.173 Larry Alexander makes a similar
argument.174 Alexander differentiates between biases or incorrect negative
stereotypes, which are intrinsically morally wrong, and discrimination based
on deep seated aversions or accurate stereotypes, which may be wrong but
not intrinsically so.175 What makes wrongful discrimination wrong, in his
view, is the context in which it is made (culture, history, or politics), and not
the act of differentiation itself. Thus, “particular types of such discrimination

165

Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411–12 (1994).
Id. at 2429.
167
Id. at 2430; Rhode, supra note 36, at 1052.
168
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29 (2008).
169
Denise Réaume, Dignity, Equality, and Comparison, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
DISCRIMINATION LAW 7, 8 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013).
170
See HELLMAN, supra note 168, at 29.
171
Id. at 25, 27.
172
Id. at 14.
173
The turn to a social context connects to Fiss’s argument regarding group discrimination, but
there is an important difference. Fiss looks at the present situation of the social group. See Fiss, supra
note 163, at 151 (“But a redistributive strategy need not rest on this idea of compensation, it need not be
backward looking”). Whereas Hellman believes that the history of mistreatment and the current status of
the social group both matter. HELLMAN, supra note 168, at 14–15.
174
See generally Alexander, supra note 163.
175
Id. at 218.
166
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will be wrong in particular cultures, historical eras, and contexts, and not
wrong in others.”176
Under any of these approaches, height discrimination is morally wrong.
First, it violates the principle of individual equality, because in most jobs
height is an irrelevant trait for performance. Employees do not perform
better because they are tall and are no less qualified when they are short.
Allowing employers to make employment decisions on the basis of an
employee’s height, therefore, contradicts the principle of equal opportunity,
and can be considered intrinsically impermissible per Alexander’s
taxonomy.177 In addition, height discrimination means giving tall people an
unfair advantage on the basis of a hereditary accident of natural endowment.
If behind a veil of ignorance (without knowing if you are short or tall)
individuals would not support a rule favoring the tall and depriving the short,
society should not implement such rule when a veil of ignorance is lifted.178
Heightism is also morally wrong when considering the principles of
group inequality and dignity. Although there is no intentional oppression on
the basis of height, both the historical background and the social context
reveal socially ingrained hierarchies between short and tall. The group of tall
people is favored and admired, and the group of short people is ridiculed and
demeaned. Stephen S. Hall, in his book, Size Matters, explains that the
origins of this attitude, at least in documented history, go back thousands of
years.179 He tells of the Roman historian Tacitus who described with awe the
Germanic tribes, just because they were tall and strong.180 He recounts
medieval and Renaissance scholarly literature that connects physical height
with moral fiber181 and he tells of the Prussian King Frederick William who
was obsessed with height and size.182
The same attitude continues today. An article in the Economist
demonstrates the meaning of height in our current society and just how
demeaning being branded “short,” or “shrimpy,” can be:
Every boy knows, practically from birth that being “shrimpy”
is nearly as bad as being a chicken, and closely related at that.
176

Id.
Id.
178
Cf. Kristen, supra note 36, at 76 (applying the Rawlsian veil of ignorance to weight
discrimination).
179
STEPHEN S. HALL, SIZE MATTERS: HOW HEIGHT AFFECTS THE HEALTH, HAPPINESS, AND
SUCCESS OF BOYS––AND THE MEN THEY BECOME 175–77 (2006). And perhaps we can find evidence of
heightism even before Roman times. The Bible itself tells of the way King Saul was elected for the high
position as follows: “[W]hen he stood among the people, he was higher than any of the people from his
shoulders and upward. And Samuel said to all the people, ‘See ye him whom the LORD has chosen, that
there is none like him among all the people?’ And all the people shouted and said, ‘God save the king!’” 1
Samuel 10:23–24 (King James).
180
HALL, supra note 179, at 175–77.
181
Id. at 177.
182
Id. at 170–73.
177
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Call a man “little”, and he is understood to be demeaned.
When Mr. Bush [President George H.W. Bush] called Mr.
Ortega [Daniel Ortega, the president of Nicaragua] “that little
man” [although Mr. Ortega stands at 5’10’’ tall], his
primate-male cerebellum knew what it was doing. It was
engaging in what may be the most enduring form of
discrimination in the world.183
Donald Trump uses the same tactics. He named Senator Marco Rubio (5’9”)
“little Marco” to put him down during the primaries debate, called ABC’s
host “little George Stephanopoulos” in order to show his contempt to the
journalist, and refers to the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, as “little
rocket man,” as if size has anything to do with the conflict.184
Leslie Martel and Henry Biller, in their book Stature and Stigma,
describe the social stigma short people face today.185 They claim that
“[i]ntensely pejorative stereotypes are associated with shortness . . . which
are absorbed even by very young children. The short male learns to perceive
his own body as defective, and the social milieu reinforces his sense of
inadequacy.”186 The empirical account given in the first part of this Article
shows the social consequences of this perception. As demonstrated, the
social norm associates height with positive qualities such as health,
intelligence, leadership, and social skills, and this perception negatively
affects short people’s well-being and their chances of success in social and
employment contexts.187 In language we categorize “short” as a negative
adjective, and in popular culture, short characters are depicted merely as a
comic relief.188
There can be little doubt, therefore, that like race or gender, the cultural
meaning assigned to shortness is that of inferiority. Short stature in our
society, in the past as well as in the present, has become a symbol of low
status, of failure (as in “selling himself short”), and even of defect. To
discriminate on the basis of height is, therefore, to treat the group of short
people as having an unequal moral worth. Heightism, thus, is demeaning in
the sense Deborah Hellman assigns to the word, and it perpetuates the status
hierarchies between tall and short in the same manner that Fiss and Sunstein

183

ECONOMIST, supra note 107 (emphasis added).
See sources cited supra note 13.
185
MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 8, at 38–39.
186
Id. at 39–40.
187
See Blaker et al., supra note 12, at 17 (“Research shows a positive relationship between tall
stature and measures of status and leadership.”).
188
See supra notes 66–67 and text accompanying notes 65–73.
184
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have argued about racism.189 It is immoral and objectionable, both with
respect to short individuals and with respect to short people as a group.
In addition to the moral argument, height discrimination can also be
objectionable from an economic perspective. Although there is a fierce
economic debate on the desirability of anti-discrimination legislation,190
many economists believe discrimination distorts the efficient allocation of
189

HELLMAN, supra note 168, at 28–29; see also Fiss, supra note 163, at 134–35 (discussing
subordination dynamics); Sunstein, supra note 165, at 2435 (noting the theory that hierarchy based on
race is unnatural).
190
Some economists argue that anti-discrimination laws, in general, are unnecessary because
market forces can eliminate discrimination in a more efficient manner. GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 84–89 (2d ed. 1971). Gary Becker claims that employers have an
exogenous taste for discrimination, in the sense that discriminating employers have an aversion to
associating with certain types of people—for example, white employers may have an aversion to black
employees (this argument can also apply with equal force to an aversion against women, Muslims, short
people, and so on). See id. at 39 (stating that single employers do not discriminate based on objective
criteria but rather subjective bias). This aversion renders the hiring of black employees more costly,
because the employer’s dislike of black people adds a non-monetary cost. Id. at 39–41. Discriminating
employers, therefore, prefer to hire more expensive white employees, in order to avoid the extra,
non-monetary cost associated with hiring black ones, but as a result their costs of production rise. Id. at
41. Altogether, the idea is that they become less efficient than their non-discriminating peers, and in the
long run they will be forced out of the market, and the discrimination will be eliminated. Id. Relying on
Becker’s model, scholars of law and economics argued that anti-discrimination laws are useless and
damaging: they claim that on the one hand, the laws are very expensive to administer, and further, there
is little evidence that they actually do any work to eliminate discrimination. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1320 (1989) (describing
inefficiencies). See also RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2 (1992) (opining that antidiscrimination laws focus “too heavily on historical
injustices . . . and too little on economic and social consequences” of their enforcement). On the other
hand, Becker’s model is also highly contested among economists. Kenneth Arrow, for example, showed
that to sustain the model, discrimination must be widespread, because otherwise the discriminated
employees will be able to find a job at non-discriminating firms for a typical worker’s wages. KENNETH
J. ARROW, SOME MODELS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE LABOR MARKET, at vi (1971). In this
case, the salary of the non-discriminated employees (the white employees in our example) will not rise,
and discriminating employees will not be less efficient than non-discriminating ones. Id. Edmund S.
Phelps developed a model for statistical discrimination that shows that under certain assumptions, mainly
that certain groups are indeed less productive than others, employers can actually profit from
discrimination. Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
659, 659 (1972). Discriminating enables them to increase productivity and save on screening costs. Id.
Under Phelps’s assumptions, market forces not only do not diminish the discrimination, but they actually
strengthen the discrimination trend. Id. John Donohue, however, argued that even if we accept Becker’s
model, and agree that in the long-run market forces can eliminate discrimination, anti-discrimination
laws are still required for the interim period. Anti-discrimination laws accelerate the shift to the
non-discriminatory equilibrium, and thus save the interim costs associated with discrimination in the
present. John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1412, 1423–27 (1986)
[hereinafter Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?]. In addition, argues Donohue, the existence of
discrimination imposes externalities on those offended by it (not necessarily just the victims of the
discrimination). John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1589 (1992) [hereinafter Donohue, Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law]. Naturally, the market does not take into account these external effects of
discrimination, and therefore it may reach an inefficient outcome. Id.
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goods and services and that it creates externalities.191 If, due to height
discrimination, short people do not realize their full potential, then society
as a whole loses. Short people do not maximize their earning potential, and
they do not benefit society as much as they could.
These arguments mandate, from moral and economic perspectives, legal
intervention when height discrimination takes place. Society has a duty to
try and uproot the demeaning social biases against those born a few inches
short, and the law should reflect this moral standpoint and aim to alter the
way we view short people. I now proceed, therefore, to examine how the law
actually addresses height discrimination.
B. The Law on Height Discrimination
Generally speaking, there are two types of behavior which are
considered discrimination in an employment context and are actionable by
law: disparate treatment and disparate impact.192 Disparate treatment deals
with a situation where the employer intentionally treats some people less
favorably than others due to the fact that they belong to a protected group
under Title VII (e.g., women, racial minorities, etc.).193 Disparate impact
does not involve a direct mistreatment of a protected group, but rather an
indirect adverse impact of a facially neutral employment practice.194 In
Subsection 1, I explain how courts viewed height discrimination under both
these categories. I examine the relevant case law and show that under both
categories the law does not provide an adequate response to heightism. The
law usually does not recognize height discrimination itself as wrongful at
191
See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Discrimination in Employment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 615, 615–17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing both
sides and criticizing the Becker model predictions); J. G. MacIntosh, Employment Discrimination: An
Economic Perspective, 19 OTTAWA L. REV. 275, 306–08 (1987) (doubting efficiency of discriminatory
practices); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production
and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1031 (1995) (doubting the same). It should also be
noted that the economic arguments criticizing anti-discrimination laws are largely irrelevant to the
solution through which I propose to address heightism. At the heart of the economic arguments against
anti-discrimination laws are the enormous costs of administering Title VII litigation and the legal
system’s inefficiency in confronting the discrimination. The costs of litigation are arguably high, but I
believe markets can do a much better job than legislation in eliminating discrimination. Yet, as will be
elaborated further on, the solution through which I suggest to address heightism, at least at the first stage,
does not involve litigation (in courts or in any other administrative system). It requires, first and foremost,
the provision of information, which is a necessary component in reducing the discrimination in whatever
mechanism we decide to use.
192
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (describing both disparate treatment
and impact). With respect to discrimination on the basis of religion and disability there is a third category:
refusal to reasonably accommodate. This category requires the employer to accommodate the working
environment to meet the needs of a religious or a disabled person. See generally U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (discussing reasonable accommodation for disability).
193
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
194
Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
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all, and even when it does, it does so in an ineffective way. I begin with the
disparate impact doctrine, which is used to disqualify minimum height
requirements.
1. Disparate Impact
According to the disparate impact doctrine, an employment practice can
be invalidated as illegal discrimination when it disproportionally harms a
protected group under Title VII.195 The employment practice may be facially
“neutral,” but if it has a “disparate adverse impact” on women, racial
minorities, or religious groups, and if it is not essential for job performance,
it may be disqualified. A good example is a requirement of a high school
diploma. Although fair in form, such requirement was invalidated by the
Supreme Court because the Court determined it disproportionally affected
African Americans and it was not essential for performing the job at hand.196
Using the disparate impact doctrine, minimum height requirements for
certain jobs were also invalidated. Since, on average, women are shorter than
men and, on average, Asian and Latin Americans are shorter than
Anglo-Americans, these protected groups are disproportionately harmed by
the minimum height requirement. The Court considered such treatment
illegal discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlinson, where the Court used the
disparate impact doctrine to nullify minimum height and weight
requirements for a position of prison guard in Alabama. The Court
determined that the two requirements combined excluded over 30% of the
female population, as opposed to only 1% of the male population, and since
the State offered no explanation as to why the requirements were essential
for good job performance, the requirements were found to be in violation of
Title VII.197 Correspondingly, in Davis v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth
Circuit found that the height requirements of the Los Angeles Fire
Department had a discriminatory impact on the basis of national origin.198
The 5’7” height requirement disqualified 41% of otherwise eligible
Mexican-American applicants (far more than Anglo-American
applicants)199 without proof that it was manifestly related to the job of a
firefighter.200 Courts have interpreted minimum height requirements to
195

Id.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (such requirement de facto operated “to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices,” and the employer was unable to prove the connection between a
high school diploma and a successful performance on the job).
197
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1977).
198
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, County
of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 (1979).
199
Id. at 1377. The average height of Hispanic-American males is 5’4.5”, as opposed to 5’8” of
Anglo-American males. See 3-60 LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 60.02 (Matthew Bender
& Co. 2017), LexisNexis.
200
The County of Los Angeles later appealed to the Supreme Court; the case was vacated as moot
because the discriminatory practice was subsequently remedied, but the Ninth Circuit’s decision
196
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create at least a prima facie case for disparate impact discrimination. They
have disqualified these practices unless the defendant was able to show that
the practices were job-related or that they resulted from a bona fide business
necessity.201
But notwithstanding the invalidation of minimal height requirements, I
maintain that the disparate impact doctrine does not serve as an adequate
response to the heightism phenomenon. It protects the already protected
Title VII groups from indirect discrimination, but in terms of prohibiting
height discrimination per se, it is both ineffective and normatively wrong.
It is ineffective because employers who wish to discriminate on the basis
of height can easily circumvent the application of the disparate impact
doctrine. Instead of establishing a single uniform minimal height
requirement, which has a disproportional impact on certain protected groups
(those shorter than average), employers can create a different minimum
height requirement for different groups—for example, females and males or
Latin Americans and Anglo-Americans. This method has already been tried
and accepted by the courts. Eastern Airlines created two separate sets of
height requirements for flight attendants—one for males (between 5’7” and
6’2”) and the other for females (between 5’2” and 5’9”).202 This policy was
challenged by a female flight attendant, but her claim was rejected.203 The
court determined that the policy had no discriminatory effect because it had
the same impact on males and females.204 Thus, since policies discriminating
against short people can be designed so that they do not constitute
discrimination against other protected classes, a direct approach should be
adopted.
But more importantly, the disparate impact doctrine is not sufficient to
address heightism because it misconceives the social perceptions that are the
basis of height discrimination. It does not capture the gender stereotyping
height discrimination makes—that in this case works more against men and
less against women. At the heart of heightism is the social expectation for
males to fit the stereotypical western body size. Just as women suffer from
the societal expectation to be thin (and perhaps fragile), men suffer from the
regarding the disparate impact of the minimal height requirement remained unchanged. County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 629 (1979).
201
See 3-60 LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 199, § 60.02; Allen L.
Schwartz, Annotation, Employer’s Height or Weight Requirement as Unlawful Employment Practice
Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 29 A.L.R. Fed. 792 § 2[a]
(1976) (“Although employers’ height or weight requirements for employees are not specifically alluded
to in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), it has been held that such
requirements are within the proscriptions of Title VII if they have a discriminatory effect as to protected
groups . . . and if such requirements cannot be justified as bona fide occupational qualifications . . . .”
(internal citations omitted)).
202
Smith v. E. Airlines, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 214, 216 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
203
Id. at 220.
204
Id. at 218.
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societal expectation to be tall and massive. We want our men to be strong,
dominant, and tough. When they are not, we do not see them fit to be leaders,
CEOs, policemen, or firefighters. But if the expectation to be tall and
powerful is largely associated with the male gender, it makes little sense to
confront height discrimination via the disproportional impact minimal
height requirements have on women or on other protected groups. The
disparate impact minimal height requirements have on protected groups is
but a derivative side effect of the main problem of heightism—the fact that
short people, especially short men, are perceived as inferior to others. They
are hired less, promoted less, and paid less—not because they are women or
because they are of a certain race or religion—but precisely because they are
short.205 The height is the issue, not the effect height discrimination has on
the currently protected groups.
Thus, if we want to uproot heightism we need to address the biases
people have against short people directly, and not address the side effects
such biases have on other groups in the society. Height discrimination
should be addressed through the disparate treatment doctrine, which is
designed to address direct discrimination, and not indirectly through the
disparate impact doctrine. Unfortunately, however, the disparate treatment
doctrine is also of little help.
2. Disparate Treatment
Notwithstanding moral and other justifications for addressing
heightism, courts have rejected claims based directly on height
discrimination. Despite the undeniable prevalence of height discrimination
(as shown in the previous part), the disparate treatment doctrine is not used
to challenge heightism. Height discrimination, it seems, does not fit the
doctrinal framework of the disparate treatment discrimination.
One possible reason for the misfit between height discrimination and the
disparate treatment doctrine is evidentiary. According to legal doctrine, in
disparate treatment, as opposed to disparate impact, it is not enough that the
outcome is discriminatory—the plaintiff is required to show a discriminatory
motive.206 The court needs to consider the decision maker’s state of mind
and determine whether the discrimination was intentional and not just
random.207 With respect to height discrimination, however, this seems hard
to do. As explained before, the discrimination is often unconscious and the
evidence is mainly statistical. The data may show discrimination towards
short people in general, but it is difficult to demonstrate intentional
discriminatory behavior towards any short individual/employee in
205

(2010).

DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 28

206

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).
Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jeffrey R. Boles, Intent and Liability in Employment Discrimination, 53
AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 613 (2016).
207
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particular. But despite this evidentiary difficulty, it seems unlikely that this
is the reason height discrimination is not considered illegal disparate
treatment practice. With regard to other types of discrimination, in the past
at least, courts permitted plaintiffs to establish systemic disparate treatment
cases, which focused on pattern and practices towards protected groups as a
whole and not just towards one particular individual.208 Courts also agreed
to infer intent from circumstantial evidence and, in particular, from
statistical evidence regarding the effects of the discriminating practice on
the group.209 Thus, in Hazelwood School District, the Court explained that
where gross statistical disparities can be shown, that alone may constitute
prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.210 Although the
strength of statistical evidence diminished in Wal-Mart,211 recently in Tyson
Food, the Court clarified such evidence is still permissible in appropriate
cases.212 There is no reason, therefore, why height discrimination statistics
should not be employed to prove systemic disparate treatment height
discrimination cases. And in any event, courts have never relied on this
reason to reject a height discrimination case.
The reason courts use to dismiss height discrimination cases is that
height is not a protected quality under Title VII. Title VII does not mention
208
THOMAS R. HAGGARD ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 53–54 (2d ed.
2008); MICHEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 107 (8th
ed. 2013); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 119 (2003).
209
RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVE L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 1:9
(2018); Amelia M. Wirts, Discriminatory Intent and Implicit Bias: Title VII Liability for Unwitting
Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 809, 835–36 (2017).
210
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977) (explaining that absent the
discriminatory practices, the composition of employees should be representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population, and when the plaintiff shows a disparity from the representative
composition it is indicative of discrimination); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339 (1977) (illustrating another example of statistical evidence constituting prima facie proof of
employment discrimination).
211
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356–58 (2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s statistical
evidence as showing prima facie proof of disparate treatment); see also Tristin K. Green, The Future of
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 405 (2011) (suggesting that
after Wal-Mart, statistical evidence is not sufficient to prove systemic disparate treatment, but rather
plaintiffs must show a company-wide policy of discrimination); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 480 (2011)
(analyzing the impact of Wal-Mart and the need to go beyond statistical evidence to establish
employment discrimination). For a retrospective view of Wal-Mart after several years, see Stephanie
Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1072–77 (2017) (arguing that Wal-Mart’s
effect on the disparate treatment doctrine was not as severe as had been expected: “A basic survey of
Title VII cases decided by federal courts in the wake of Wal-Mart reveals that the bark—the decision’s
potential impact on the future of implicit bias evidence—may have been bigger than its bite.”).
212
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016); see also Robert G. Bone, Tyson
Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication, 95 N.C. L. REV. 607, 610 (2017) (“In an important
decision last term, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the Supreme Court changed course and breathed
new life into statistical adjudication.” (citation omitted)).
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short people as a protected group213 and, in light of the legislature’s
omission, courts refuse to give remedy to people discriminated against on
the basis of their height. Short people remain remediless, even in situations
which would surely count as discrimination with respect to Title VII
protected groups. In the case of Smith v. Wilkinsburg, for example, the court
affirmed a rule requiring police officers to be at least 5’8” tall.214 Despite the
fact that the Police Commission failed to show that height is a necessary, or
even a relevant, quality to the performance as a police officer, the court
refused to accept a height discrimination argument as a basis for legal
action.215 The court explained:
Plaintiff cites no authority to support his obvious contention
that “height” discrimination constitutes a violation of Title
VII. To the contrary, that the statutory language means
precisely what it says was recently confirmed by the Fourth
Circuit in King v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 538 F.2d
581, 583, 13 FEP Cases 122-123 (4 Cir. 1976) . . . .216
The court also refused to give remedy to Gloria Ekerman, a 4’10”
woman working in the Chicago police force.217 Her deputy chief officer,
Lesniak, told her, “Boy are you short. How tall are you? How can you do
this job?”218 But the court did not see this remark as illegal discrimination.219
The statute, according to the court, does not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of height or size, and Lesniak never made any explicit remark towards
Ekerman that could be connected to the protected forms of discrimination
(such as sex discrimination).220
It seems, therefore, that the federal legislature’s decision not to include
height or size as a protected quality under Title VII is the reason why height
discrimination is not seen as illegal disparate treatment. Courts see the
protected groups of Title VII as a closed list, and they do not afford
protection to groups not mentioned in the statute. Indeed, the few scholars
who have noticed the height discrimination phenomenon have advocated for
the legal prohibition on discrimination to extend to height based
discrimination.221 They suggest either broadening the list of protected groups
under Title VII to include short people or enacting similar state legislation,
213
214

1977).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
Smith v. Wilkinsburg, No. 75-513, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15926, at *1, *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12,

215

Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
217
Ekerman v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 9686, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3775, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 12, 2003).
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
RHODE, supra note 205, at 93.
216
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so as to allow a remedy for those who are discriminated against due to their
height.222 Experience shows, however, that in jurisdictions that have
expressly prohibited height discrimination in their statute, nothing has
changed. Even when available, height discrimination provisions are not used
and the legislation, although important de jure, is de facto dead letter.
Michigan enacted the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.223 Section 37.2202
of the Act precludes an employer from refusing to hire or recruit, or from
otherwise discriminating against an individual due to his/her height (among
other discrimination categories), and it allows for a broad range of remedies
(including reinstatement to employment or monetary damages) when
discrimination occurs.224 Victims of discrimination can either sue in court,
or submit complaints to the Department of Civil Rights.225 But despite the
progressive statute, short individuals hardly take advantage of it. According
to Deborah Rhode, in the two-year period between 2005 and 2007, there
were only thirteen complaints involving height, seven of which also
involved weight issues.226 None of these complaints resulted in a final
judgment of discrimination, and they were either rejected or settled.227 Even
fewer cases of height discrimination ended up in the Michigan court. In more
than forty years, between 1976 and 2017, there were only five cases
involving height discrimination decided in the courts;228 two of the cases
were dismissed229 and in one case, the plaintiffs suffered from
achondroplasia dwarfism—a disability.230
The same is true with respect to local governments that enacted
anti-height discrimination provisions. The City of Santa Cruz’s ordinance
states that it is the intent of the Council “to protect and safeguard the right
and opportunity of all persons to be free from all forms of arbitrary
discrimination, including discrimination based on . . . physical
characteristics.”231 The definition of the term “physical characteristic”
includes height, and the ordinance permits the imposition of fines on
discriminating employers.232 Isaac B. Rosenberg, however, examined the
222

Id. at 154; Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 910.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
224
Id. §§ 37.2202, 37.2801.
225
Id. §§ 37.2801, 37.2602.
226
RHODE, supra note 205, at 132–33.
227
Id. at 133.
228
See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 944 n.288 (explaining that Michigan has only received a
handful of height-based cases during this period, most of which have failed).
229
Berry v. Way Bakeries, Inc., No. 248841, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 459, at *10–13 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2005); Terry v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., No. 263339, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 3202, at *4–
6 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
230
Snyder v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, No. 15-cv-12238, 2016 WL 3213388, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 10,
2016).
231
SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.83.010 (2019).
232
Id. §§ 9.83.020(12), 9.83.120(2).
223

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 223

7/28/20 10:48 AM

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

752

[Vol. 52:2

use of the local ordinance and could not find even a single complaint alleging
height discrimination since 1992.233 The San Francisco code also has various
provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of height.234 The City’s
human rights commission issued compliance guidelines to prohibit weight
and height discrimination, which require “all agencies, business
establishments and organizations” not to discriminate on the basis of weight
or height when providing services, employment, or housing.235 But here
again, according to Rosenberg, no complaints of height discrimination were
filed.236 The potential legal remedy is not used, and the existence of an
anti-height discrimination statute makes little difference. The District of
Columbia,237 Urbana, Illinois,238 Howard County, Maryland,239 and
Madison, Wisconsin,240 all have anti-personal appearance discrimination
provisions that can include height; but in all the jurisdictions the provision
is a dead letter. In the District of Columbia there is only one height
discrimination case on record since 1981;241 in Urbana there is no height
discrimination case reported in the last thirty years since the ordinance was
enacted;242 and in Howard County there is just one appearance-based
complaint between 2003–2007, and it remains unclear whether the case was
based on height.243
These figures cast doubt on the efficiency of anti-height discrimination
clauses in general and on proposals to adopt them in state or in the federal
system. As shown, even when the legislature expressly allows the possibility
for a disparate treatment discrimination claim on the basis of height, no
height discrimination claims are filed. Short people do not take advantage of
the potential of these sections, and employers are hardly deterred by them.

233

Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 943 n.287.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 12, § 12A.1 (2001). The City requires all city departments and all
its contracting agencies to include a non-discrimination clause, including non-height discrimination, in
all of their contracts. Id. at ch. 12B, § 12B.2(a).
235
See S.F., CAL. POLICE CODE art. 33, §§ 3303, 3304 (2002), http://sfhrc.org/sites/default/files/Police_Code_Article%2033_6-13-2016_1.pdf.
236
Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 943 n.287.
237
D.C. CODE § 4-1001.1 (2001).
238
URBANA, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 12 (2007).
239
COUNTY OF HOWARD, MD., CODE § 12.200(II) (1992).
240
MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 39 (2007).
241
Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 944 n.288. See also Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of
Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1084 (2009) (noting the lack of enforcement with the District of
Columbia code).
242
RHODE, supra note 205, at 127.
243
Id. at 130–31 (reporting that the Equal Opportunity Commission of Madison, Wisconsin receives
the largest number of complaints, but according to her account none of the complaints relates to height
discrimination).
234
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III. NAMING, BLAMING, AND CLAIMING HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION
The analysis leaves us with a conundrum. On the one hand, we see that
height discrimination is a widespread phenomenon, and that short people
often suffer because of their height. These individuals are not hired. They
are overlooked in promotions. They are not adequately compensated. On the
other hand, the legal tools that can address heightism, even when available,
are left unused. Laws that offer remedies against height discrimination
(whether state or local) remain a dead letter, as if the problem does not exist
at all. As the economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, once said, the bias towards
tallness and against shortness is one of society’s “most blatant and forgiven
prejudices.”244
In this Section, I seek to better understand the sources of this
conundrum—to examine why, despite the fact that height discrimination is
undoubtedly and blatantly harmful, society, and short people in particular,
remain passive and even forgiving about it. To do so I combine two strands
of literature. The first is the socio-legal literature about the initiation of legal
disputes in general. The second is the psychological literature about the
attribution of certain behaviors to discrimination. The combination of these
two strands of literature suggests that the initiation of legal proceedings with
respect to height discrimination is especially difficult.
A. The Process Through Which Injurious Experiences Become Legal
Disputes
Problematic and injurious experiences are by no means rare in our
everyday life.245 It is not uncommon for employees to be treated unfairly or
be discriminated against, for consumers to be damaged by products they
consume, or for shareholders and other stakeholders to be harmed by corrupt
corporate decisions. But notwithstanding the abundance of injurious
experiences, only a portion of such experiences transform into legal
disputes.246 In most cases, the injured party remains passive, and the
experience passes with no compensation or remedy. Why do some injurious
experiences give rise to legal disputes, while other experiences, which are
perhaps no less harmful, do not have a similar impact? What is the process
through which an injurious experience is transformed into a dispute that will
result in a remedy for the injured party?
244

GORDON L. PATZER, THE POWER AND PARADOX OF PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS 120 (2006)
(emphasis added) (quoting John Kenneth Galbraith, Galbraith: Turning Economics to Show Biz,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 18, 1977, at 22).
245
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 633 (1980–81) (“Trouble, problems, personal and social
dislocation are everyday occurrences.”).
246
Id. at 636.
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In their seminal article The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming, William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin
Sarat explore this question.247 They identify three stages that are required in
order for a legal dispute to emerge from an injurious experience, and they
analyze the causes and effects of the transformation between the stages.
Since their analysis, I believe, is very much relevant to the impact of height
discrimination, I briefly discuss the different stages in which disputes
emerge.
The first stage, which Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat call “naming,” is the
initial perception that an injury has transpired. In this stage, a person realizes
that a certain experience has devalued her in some way, and she can observe
(“name”) the injury.248 They argue that the perception of an injurious
experience is by definition illusive because it often depends on initial
societal perceptions. Thus, if society does not perceive an experience as
disvaluing, individuals will not perceive it as such as well, even if
subjectively they feel harmed.249 After an injury is perceived (“named”), the
second stage of the transformation is the attribution of the injury to actions
or omissions of another. It does not suffice that the victim understands that
she is injured; she must also hold someone else responsible for the injury
(“blaming”).250 The third and final stage of the transformation is called
“claiming.” Claiming takes place when the blame, attributed in the second
stage, is voiced to the person who is believed to be responsible or to a
competent authority in a request for remedy.251 In case the responsible party
accepts the claim, then the grievance is settled, and no legal action is
necessary. In case the claim is rejected, then a dispute between the parties is
created. 252
The transformation of an injurious experience through the three stages
into a legal dispute is by no means a certain or predictable process. It is not
clear under what circumstances an experience will be perceived as injurious,
whether the injury can and will be attributed to a legal person, and whether
the grievance will be voiced and transformed into a dispute.253 The
transformation depends on the parties involved, their economic means and
personality, the relationship among them, the social perceptions that

247

Id.
Id. at 635.
249
For example, if society does not perceive an infringement of privacy as disvaluing, people will
fail to “name” an invasion of their privacy as an injury, even if subjectively they are harmed and offended.
250
Felstiner and his team distinguish blaming from general complaints. Felstiner et al., supra note
245, at 635 (explaining that, in order for a grievance to be initiated, a person must attribute her injury to
actions or omissions of a certain party).
251
Id. at 635–36.
252
Id. at 636.
253
Id. at 637.
248
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surround the experience, and many more factors.254 One important factor is
the area of law to which the injurious experience can be categorized—
contract, torts, consumer protection, property, and so on. A study by Richard
Miller and Austin Sarat examined the likelihood of claiming in injurious
experiences involving damages of $1000 or more.255 According to their
findings, in most legal contexts (specifically torts, consumer protection, and
property), more than 70% of the individuals who have an injurious
experience make claims for redress, and about two-thirds of these claims
transform into legal disputes.256 A noticeable exception, however, are
injurious experiences connected to discrimination. Here, despite a relatively
high percentage of individuals reporting a discriminatory experience, the
claiming rate drops to below 30%.257 Jeffrey FitzGerald reports a similar
pattern in Australia. According to FitzGerald, the claim rate in torts,
consumer claims, and landlord claims are all above 80%, while
discrimination grievances have the lowest claim rate of below 50%.258
The low claim rate in discriminatory experiences is often attributed to
difficulties in the claiming stage. Victims of discrimination are aware of the
injury they suffered (they name the injury), and they attribute the injury to
the perpetrator’s discriminatory behavior (they blame the perpetrator), but
they are reluctant to make the claim. They are concerned with the social
stigma that may ensue from such claim, are not sure whether they have
sufficient evidence, or are concerned about the employment
repercussions.259 Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman argue that the low
claim rate stems from a problematic legal doctrine.260 They argue that, on
the one hand, Title VII does not give employees who suffer from
discrimination sufficient time to process the experience, and on the other
hand, Title VII does not give those employees sufficient protection from a
254

Id. at 639–51. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of
America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & SOC’Y 400, 400–16 (1991) (comparing
“claiming” rates among different countries).
255
Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 534–46 (1980–81). Miller and Sarat report on a relatively wide
household survey—1000 randomly selected households from five federal districts. The interviewer in
the survey inquired whether the household was involved in injurious experience involving damages of
$1000 or more, and if so, whether the household filed a legal claim. For a survey of researches of
“claiming” in different areas of law, see Kritzer, supra note 254, at 402–06.
256
Miller & Sarat, supra note 255, at 561.
257
Id. at 563–64.
258
Jeffrey FitzGerald, Grievances, Disputes & Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia and the
United States, 1 LAW CONTEXT 15, 31 (1983); see also W. A. Bogart & Neil Vidmar, Problems and
Experience with the Ontario Civil Justice System: An Empirical Assessment, in ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE
1, 9, 13 (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1990) (reporting various discrimination grievances in Canada).
259
For a research survey on the subject, see L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women”
Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 737–42 (2007).
260
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System,
86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 905–16 (2008).
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potential retaliation by their employers.261 According to Brake and
Grossman, under these legal constraints, many discriminated employees
decide not to file a claim at all, or they miss the short period in which they
had a chance to file it.262
These explanations hold true also with respect to height discrimination.
Just as with other types of discrimination, height discrimination victims are
not sufficiently protected from their employers and they may suffer social
stigma as a result of their complaint. In addition, legal doctrine on height
discrimination is not yet settled, and so the chances of success, even in
jurisdictions that have a specific height discrimination statute, are relatively
uncertain. However, with respect to height discrimination, the obstacles are
even more severe. Victims of height discrimination, I argue, have difficulties
not only in the claiming stage of the initiation of legal disputes, but also, and
more importantly, in the “naming” stage. The victims of heightism do not
perceive the experiences they undergo as an injury, and they do not attribute
the maltreatment to discrimination. In the following, I use psychological
research to develop this point and explain the difficulties in the “naming” of
height discrimination.
B. The Attribution of Certain Behaviors to Height Discrimination
Generally speaking, people usually do not attribute bad outcomes or
negative experiences from which they suffer to discrimination.263 They tend
to attribute the outcomes to their own behavior or to their lack of skills,
rather than to the attitude of the decision maker who mistreated them (their
employer, their evaluator, their teacher, and so on).264 These difficulties, I
261

Id. at 867–70, 894, 902–06.
Id. at 934; see also Laura B. Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States (Am. Bar Found., Research Paper No. 08-04, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093313 (analyzing whether employment
discrimination litigation provides meaningful remedies for targets of employment discrimination).
263
See Derek R. Avery et al., What Are the Odds? How Demographic Similarity Affects the
Prevalence of Perceived Employment Discrimination, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 235, 236 (2008) (“We
should note that research . . . has shown some individuals to be reluctant to attribute negative experiences
to discrimination.”). For a summary of some of these studies, see Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not
Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275,
1292–1300 (2012). Interestingly, although people tend to minimize their own personal discrimination,
they do recognize that the group they belong to as a whole suffers from discrimination. Thus, as Faye
Crosby explains, women acknowledge that women in general are being discriminated against, but they
deny their own personal discrimination. See generally Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal
Discrimination, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 371 (1984). Crosby points out the irony in this attitude as
follows: “The major premise states; [sic] ‘Women are discriminated against.’ The minor premise states:
‘I am a woman.’ But instead of the expected conclusion (‘therefore, I am discriminated against’), women
seem to say, ‘Phew, that was a close call.’ Such reasoning smacks of denial.” Id. at 372.
264
The tendency to minimize personal, as opposed to group, discrimination was demonstrated in
multiple psychological researches. Karen Ruggiero and Donald Taylor, for example, conducted an
experiment designed to examine people’s perception of situations in which discriminatory practices may
262
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argue, are even more severe when it comes to height discrimination. The
characteristics of height discrimination render it elusive, and due to our
cognitive patterns the “naming” of height discrimination is complicated.
In her article, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, Katie Eyer reviews the psychological
literature concerning the perception of discrimination.265 She explains that,
similar to the perception of objects (such as a table or a chair),266 we decide
have played a role. See generally Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Coping with Discrimination:
How Disadvantaged Group Members Perceive the Discrimination that Confronts Them, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 826, 832–33 (1995). In their experiment, participants, female university
students, were purposefully given a failing grade in a writing test and were then asked to explain their
bad results. Id. The results of the experiment show that although the participants were told, supposedly
in confidence, that the majority of the judges that graded the tests are known to discriminate against
women, participants tended to attribute their failure to the quality of their answers much more than to
possible discrimination. Id. at 833–35. In all cases, except when participants were told that 100% of the
judges were discriminating, the vast majority of them believed that their grade was due to the quality of
their writing, rather than to the flawed grading of a biased judge. Id. at 836. Other experiments, using a
different design, reached comparable conclusions. Collette Eccleston and Brenda Major described to
participants, 160 Latino-American Students, a set of negative, albeit ambiguous, experiences, in which
discrimination may have played a role (such as maltreatment at a restaurant, a job interview, mistreatment
by the police, and more). Collette P. Eccleston & Brenda N. Major, Attributions to Discrimination and
Self-Esteem: The Role of Group Identification and Appraisals, 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL.
147, 151–53 (2006). They asked the participants whether they attribute the maltreatment in the situation
described to discrimination or to other more benign reasons. Although all of the described scenarios
indicated at least suspicious behavior (by a landlord/restaurant owner/policeman, etc.), participants rated
the probability they were connected to discrimination on average by less than 40%. Id. at 153. Most
participants did not connect the described scenarios with ethnicity, but related them to factors other than
prejudice. Id. at 154. Correspondingly, Teri Elkins and James Phillips described fictitious employment
scenarios and examined people’s perceptions as to the likelihood of gender discrimination. Teri J. Elkins
& James S. Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination Claims: The Mediating Role of Attributions, 84 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 186, 190 (1999). Their experiment shows that unless the evidence alluding to
discrimination was strong, most of the participants did not believe discrimination took place. Id. at 193–
96. They attributed the negative outcome to the female-plaintiff or to other reasons that were unconnected
to prejudices against women. Id. at 196. For more discussion of how members of stigmatized groups
process discrimination, see Brenda Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination and Self-Esteem: Impact
of Group Identification and Situational Ambiguity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 220, 221–29
(2003); Robin E. Roy et al., If She’s a Feminist It Must Not Be Discrimination: The Power of the Feminist
Label on Observers’ Attributions About a Sexist Event, 60 SEX ROLES 422, 428–29 (2009); Gretchen B.
Sechrist et al., When Do the Stigmatized Make Attributions to Discrimination Occurring to the Self and
Others? The Roles of Self-Presentation and Need for Control, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111,
117–21 (2004); Anna Berlin, The Effects of Differential Discrimination Cues on Attributions for Failure:
Implications for Subsequent Performance (Aug. 2006) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, Ohio University),
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/pg_10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION_NUM:ohiou1156451468.
265
Eyer, supra note 263, at 1292.
266
Generally, in order to decide the nature of a certain object, the human brain often relies on
pre-existing mental prototypes. We take the incoming data we receive about the object, and compare it
to an existing mental template we already have that our brain associates with the object. Eyer, supra note
263, at 1311–12. If there is a match, the object is identified. If there are too many divergences, then the
template is rejected. People, for example, have a mental prototype of a table as a flat surface on legs. If
our senses observe a flat surface on legs, our brain knows it is a table. If the surface is smaller and has a
back support, we know to classify it as a chair. Id. at 1312. Following experiments, Eyer maintains that
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whether a certain behavior is discriminatory by using a mental template of
discriminatory behavior. Our brain holds a kind of prototype of how
discrimination should look and to assess whether a certain behavior or
outcome is discriminatory we compare the incoming information about the
behavior to the mental discrimination prototype we have. To the extent there
is a match, we classify the behavior as discriminatory; otherwise, we explain
the behavior or outcome through other causes (often reasons connected to
our own performance).267
Psychological research characterizes several common features of this
mental template we tend to have of discrimination.268 It does not mean that
absent one or more of these features no one will perceive a behavior as
discriminatory, but it does mean that most people are less likely to do so.
The literature identifies five important features of the discrimination
proto-type:269 (1) discrimination needs to be intentional;270 (2)
discrimination needs to cause some sort of harm;271 (3) discrimination
should be manifested within the “classic disparate treatment dyads” (i.e.,
man discriminating against woman, white discriminating against black, and
the same procedure works not only with respect to objects, but also with respect to more complex and
abstract concepts or phenomena, such as discrimination. Id.
267
Eyer, supra note 263, at 1312–13; Brenda Major & Tessa L. Dover, Attributions to
Discrimination: Antecedents and Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND
DISCRIMINATION 213, 216 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009).
268
Eyer, supra note 263, at 1313.
269
Eyer details four of these features in her model. Id. at 1314–15. She does not view the domain
in which the behavior takes place (the fourth feature) as a separate feature of the discrimination mental
template.
270
See Mindi D. Foster & Kenneth L. Dion, The Role of Hardiness in Moderating the Relationship
Between Global/Specific Attributions and Actions Against Discrimination, 51 SEX ROLES 161, 161–68
(2004) (relating actions to discrimination); Diane M. Kappen & Nyla R. Branscombe, The Effects of
Reasons Given for Ineligibility on Perceived Gender Discrimination and Feelings of Injustice, 40 BRIT .
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 301–03 (2001) (comparing discrimination attributions and personal attributions);
Stefanie Simon et al., Pick Your Perspective: Racial Group Membership and Judgments of Intent, Harm,
and Discrimination, 22 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 215, 215–17, 229–30 (2019) (arguing
that intentional discrimination can be difficult to prove when subtle) [hereinafter Simon et al., Judgments
of Intent, Harm, and Discrimination]; Janet K. Swim et al., The Role of Intent and Harm in Judgments
of Prejudice and Discrimination, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 944, 956–57 (2003) [hereinafter
Swim et al., The Role of Intent and Harm] (discussing the influence of intent on judgments).
271
See Swim et al., The Role of Intent and Harm, supra note 270, at 944, 956 (“Consistent with the
current conceptualization of prejudice and the legal concept of adverse impact, harm played an important
role in judgments of prejudice and discrimination.”); Janet K. Swim et al., Judgments of Sexism: A
Comparison of the Subtlety of Sexism Measures and Sources of Variability in Judgments of Sexism, 29
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406, 408–10 (2005) (“[E]xpressions of traditional gender-role and hostile sexist
beliefs are more likely to be identified as sexist than expressions of modern and benevolent sexist
beliefs.”); Lisa Feldman Barrett & Janet K. Swim, Appraisals of Prejudice and Discrimination, in
PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 11, 22 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998)
(predicting that “attributions to prejudice will become more likely as the negative consequences and the
behavior in question become increasingly contiguous”); Simon et al., Judgments of Intent, Harm, and
Discrimination, supra note 270, at 216 (positing that “people consider intent and harm when making
judgments of racial discrimination”).
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so on);272 (4) the discrimination should occur in a domain in which the
victim’s group is usually negatively stereotyped;273 and (5) the victim of the
discrimination should not have control over her stigmatized status.274
Unfortunately, except for the last feature, height discrimination does not fit
these attributes, and so we fail to recognize it as discrimination.
The first feature of our discrimination prototype is intent.275 If we
believe someone intentionally treats a member of a protected group (like
women or racial minorities) less favorably, then we are more likely to view
that behavior as discrimination.276 The centrality of the intent in our mental
template can be seen even in the legal doctrine. In order to prove disparate
treatment discrimination, the victim needs to show the perpetrator’s intent
to discriminate; otherwise, the legal system does not recognize the
discrimination.277 Height discrimination, however, is usually not intentional.
As we have seen, it is an unconscious behavior, stemming from deep
evolutionary mechanisms, rather than from a desire to inflict harm on the
short or to confer a benefit on the tall.278 As Rosenberg points out, in most
cases employers do not have formal rules barring short applicants from being

272
Eyer, supra note 263, at 1301. See Angela J. Krumm & Alexandra F. Corning, Perceived Control
as a Moderator of the Prototype Effect in the Perception of Discrimination, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1109, 1110–11 (2008) (discussing how “perceptions of discrimination are influenced by individuals’
prototypes” and “individuals are highly sensitive to stimuli that fit their prototypes of discrimination”);
Avery et al., supra note 263, at 236 (“Prior research has shown individuals are more likely to detect
discriminatory treatment when it is consistent with their expectations.” (citations omitted)); Mary L.
Inman & Robert S. Baron, Influence of Prototypes on Perceptions of Prejudice, 70 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 727, 732 (1996) (“[O]ur expectancies (i.e., stereotypes) regarding prejudice influence
our tendency to describe potentially biased behavior as an instance of prejudice.”); Stefanie Simon et al.,
Prototypes of Discrimination: How Status Asymmetry and Stereotype Asymmetry Affect Judgments of
Racial Discrimination, 35 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 530–31 (2013) [hereinafter Simon et
al., Status Asymmetry and Stereotype Asymmetry] (discussing how prototypes impact attributions to
discrimination differently among White and Black Americans).
273
Laurie T. O’Brien et al., How Status and Stereotypes Impact Attributions to Discrimination: The
Stereotype-Asymmetry Hypothesis, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 405, 405 (2008); Simon et al.,
Status Asymmetry and Stereotype Asymmetry, supra note 272, at 531.
274
See, for example, three psychological studies addressing discrimination and beliefs about the
controllability of weight: Bruce Blaine & Zoe Williams, Belief in the Controllability of Weight and
Attributions to Prejudice Among Heavyweight Women, 51 SEX ROLES 79, 83 (2004); Jennifer Crocker et
al., The Stigma of Overweight: Affective Consequences of Attributional Ambiguity, 64 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 60, 67 (1993); Brenda Major et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Attributions to
Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Advances, 34 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
251, 288–89 (2002).
275
Eyer, supra note 263, at 1314.
276
See supra note 270 (listing research addressing the role of intent in our understanding of
discrimination).
277
See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (describing the requirement to show intent in
employment discrimination disparate treatment claims).
278
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (discussing the evolutionary and biological
reasons for height preference).
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hired, denying their promotion, or cutting their pay.279 They do not intend
these consequences—they just act this way.280 With no intent on the side of
the discriminating employer, an employee has difficulties in “naming” the
height discrimination, and he may not even realize he was rejected or not
promoted because of his height.281
The second feature of our mental template is harm.282 Here actually,
height discrimination seems to fit the bill. As we have seen, empirical
evidence suggests that every inch of height is worth about 2.5% of wages,
and this can amount to thousands of dollars a year.283 In addition, short
individuals are sometimes not hired due to their height, and when they are
hired they are not promoted as well as their taller peers.284 This can definitely
be considered a concrete and tangible harm.
The problem with height discrimination in this respect is that, as
opposed to the more recognized (traditional) forms of discrimination, there
is no one apparent reference point against which we can measure the harm.
Usually we infer discrimination when two similarly situated persons are
different in one characteristic, X, and are treated differently because of that
characteristic (X being irrelevant to the situation, like gender, race, ethnicity,
etc.). We then look at how a person with X is treated vis-à-vis a person with
no-X, and we can measure the harm the discrimination causes.285 With
height discrimination, however, there is no one binary characteristic that one
person has and the other does not. We are all placed along a height
continuum, and we cannot divide employees into distinct separate groups of
short/tall (as we do with men/women, white/black, Muslim/Christians,
Latin/Anglo-Americans, etc.). With no distinct groups, there also is no clear
benchmark (population with no-X character) against which the harm from
height discrimination can be measured.286 To whom should an employee
compare himself—a person one inch taller, an average height person, a

279
Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 925. In very few occasions do we see a formal policy discriminating
against short people. Employers do not formally state that they will accept employees only above a certain
height, or that employees above 5’8” will earn a bonus salary.
280
See id. at 914–15 (describing ways employers exhibit “[h]eight-based prejudice” in hiring, firing,
and promotion absent formal rules).
281
See Kappen & Branscombe, supra note 270, at 310–11 (describing how, without “explicit causal
information,” disadvantaged individuals may assume personal causes for differential treatment).
282
Eyer, supra note 263, at 1314.
283
See supra notes 129–46 and accompanying text (discussing research studies that show the
relationship between height and income).
284
See supra notes 55–128 and accompanying text (listing research related to the relationship
between height and hiring and promotion).
285
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 744 (2011) (“If an
employer has two employees who are similar but for X characteristic, and the employer treats Employee
X worse than Employee Not-X, we are generally comfortable inferring that X is the basis, or cause, for
the different treatment.” (footnote omitted)).
286
Cf. Rhode, supra note 36, at 1068 (discussing the continuum which attractiveness and grooming
standards fall under).
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really tall employee? The height comparator is elusive, and so the harm
heightism inflicts is less observable.
Moreover, let us hypothetically assume we have concrete evidence
showing that a certain employer compensates employees according to their
height. Although all employees perform the same job, the employer awards
taller employees a higher salary. Just as described in the empirical data, for
every inch of height, the employer increases the salary by 2.5%. Based on
this information, who should be allowed to make a height discrimination
claim? Should an average height employee (of 5’8”) be allowed to assert a
discrimination claim vis-à-vis a taller employee (of 6’2”), or should height
discrimination claims only be available to employees below a certain height?
If we allow a height discrimination claim to all employees, then, relying on
the empirical research presented earlier, most of us are entitled to a remedy.
Height discrimination is continuous, and so average height employees are
also harmed when compared to above average height employees. But giving
average (or even above average) height employees a right of action
obviously makes little sense. It cannot be that almost everybody is
discriminated against on the basis of height, because then there is no real
discrimination. On the other hand, if we do not allow such claim, then below
what height should we allow discrimination claims, and why? A 5’3” person
is only slightly more discriminated against than a 5’5” person. Is there any
logic in allowing the former a legal remedy while denying a remedy from
the latter? Can we justify any certain threshold of height below which legal
action may be pursued, when every threshold seems equally arbitrary?
These questions make height discrimination more evasive than other
forms of discrimination. Although it clearly exists and it clearly harms short
individuals, the harm is not as lucid as in other forms of discrimination. As
a result, it does not fit our cognitive template, and so we tend not to perceive
it as discrimination—certainly not as an actionable form of discrimination.
The third and perhaps most important feature of our mental
discrimination template is that the discrimination should be associated with
the “classic disparate treatment dyad.”287 People perceive discrimination
when a man is discriminating against a woman or when a white person is
discriminating against a black person, but when discrimination is manifested
in other forms—women against men, or men against men—we find it hard
to grasp.288 By and large, the psychological literature explains this relatively
rigid view of discrimination in two connected ways.289 The first explanation
287

Eyer, supra note 263, at 1301, 1313–14.
Id. at 1313–15; Avery et al., supra note 263, at 236; Inman & Baron, supra note 272, at 737;
Krumm & Corning, supra note 272, at 1109, 1122–23; Simon et al., Status Asymmetry and Stereotype
Asymmetry, supra note 272, at 406, 410.
289
See Inman & Baron, supra note 272, at 728 (offering three possible explanations—the third
explanation being that we expect certain types of people (men, white, wealthy) to be generally intolerant
288
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connects to our vision of the “classic perpetrator” vis-à-vis “the classic
victim.”290 According to this explanation, we imagine the perpetrator of the
discrimination to be from a strong socioeconomic group and the victim to
be from a weak one. In gender-based discrimination, the perpetrator is
expected to be male and the victim female; in racial discrimination, the
perpetrator must be white and the victim black, and so on. When the actual
perpetrator and the actual victim do not fit these initial stereotypes, we tend
not to attribute the behavior to discrimination.291 A second explanation does
not concern the identity of the perpetrator/victim per se, but rather the
question of whether they belong to the same social “group.”292 According to
this explanation, embedded in our mental template of discrimination is the
notion that discrimination takes place between members of two distinct
social groups rather than between members of the same group. The more
racial/ethnic/gender dissimilarity there is between the perpetrator and the
victim, the more likely we are to perceive the discrimination.293 Using the
results of a national survey of employees, for example, Derek Avery and his
team show that perceived racial/ethnic discrimination was less prevalent
among those with same race/ethnicity supervisors than among those with
distinct race/ethnicity.294
Height discrimination, though, fits neither the classic perpetrator-victim
dyads nor the in-out group distinctions. Height discrimination is usually
of others; later literature meshed this third explanation into the first explanation (the “prototype”
explanation)); see, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 263, at 236–37 (discussing the reasons those outside of
the white male prototype are more likely to perceive discrimination).
290
Inman & Baron, supra note 272, at 728.
291
Inman and Baron conducted an experiment that demonstrates this tendency. They presented to
participants identical set of events, but changed the identities of the perpetrators and victims (male/female
or white/black). They found that, although the facts were exactly the same, participants were much more
likely to view behavior as prejudice in the classical dyad (male discriminating female or white
discriminating black) than in all other combinations (woman discriminating man, man-man or womanwoman; black discriminating white, white-white or black-black). See id. at 728; see also Michael M.
Harris et al., “I Think They Discriminated Against Me”: Using Prototype Theory and Organizational
Justice Theory for Understanding Perceived Discrimination in Selection and Promotion Situations, 12
INT’L. J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 54, 56 (2004) (applying the prototype model to discrimination
between different groups); Miriam J. Rodin et al., Asymmetry in Prejudice Attribution, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 481, 503 (1990) (discussing whether discriminatory behavior directed
by the weak toward the strong is seen as more indicative of prejudice than by the strong towards the
weak).
292
Inman & Baron, supra note 272, at 728.
293
Christine M. Riordan et al., Relational Demography Within Groups: Through the Lens of
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASES 37,
53 (Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella eds., 2005).
294
See generally Avery et al., supra note 263; see also Tamar Saguy & Lily Chernyak-Hai,
Intergroup Contact Can Undermine Disadvantaged Group Members’ Attributions to Discrimination, 48
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 714, 715 (2012) (showing that a focus on communalities between
groups can decrease the tendency of the disadvantaged group members to attribute experienced negative
outcomes to discrimination).
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directed against men, sometimes white men, by their employers (males or
females). This definitely does not fit the classic (prototypical) model of
discrimination. Since the victims of height discrimination are often members
of a class that is perceived as privileged and dominant (males), our brain
fails to conceive maltreatment that they suffer as discrimination.295 We
imagine the victims of discrimination as members of the weaker classes of
society (females or racial or religious minorities), and when the victims are
white males, the facts just do not fit the discrimination template. Moreover,
in the case of heightism the perpetrator and the victim often belong to the
same social “group.” Both can be men, both can be Caucasians, both can
come from the same socioeconomic background. The victim and the
perpetrator see themselves as equal in many social attributes (except for
height), and so discrimination seems less conceivable. The idea that
someone with the same social/demographic characteristics discriminates
“within-group” seems unreasonable, and the victim is more likely to explain
the perpetrator’s behavior through other reasons.296
This connects to the fourth feature of the mental template—the domain
in which the discrimination takes place. Research shows that our perception
of discrimination is connected not only to the behaviors and identities of the
perpetrator and victim, but also to the context in which the behavior
occurs.297 People tend to perceive discrimination in domains where the
victim’s group is negatively stereotyped, rather than in domains where the
victim’s group is positively or neutrally stereotyped.298 Laurie O’Brien and
her team show that the likelihood that people perceive a rejection of a female
applicant as discrimination increases as the stereo-typicality of the required
job skills are more masculine.299 Studies participants have also been shown
to be more likely to attribute the rejection of a black person to discrimination
when the victim was rejected in a stereotypically white domain.300 In height
discrimination, however, most of the victims are males. Usually, the
workplace is not a domain where we would expect to see discrimination
against males because males, especially white males, are advantaged in
employment spheres. They earn more money, they are the top executives,
and they are the “dominant” gender/race. To perceive discrimination against
a white male, even if he is short, is difficult, because we do not expect this
to occur in a working environment.301 Thus, although short men are hired,
295

Simon et al., Status Asymmetry and Stereotype Asymmetry, supra note 272, at 531.
Avery et al., supra note 263, at 243–44.
297
Simon et al., Status Asymmetry and Stereotype Asymmetry, supra note 272, at 531.
298
Id. at 526.
299
O’Brien et al., supra note 273, at 407.
300
Simon et al., Status Asymmetry and Stereotype Asymmetry, supra note 272, at 531.
301
We do expect discrimination against short men in the social sphere. Short men know that women
prefer men who are taller than they are, and it may not come as a surprise when a short man has less
success in dating sites than his taller friends. For the social aspects of heightism see sources cited supra
note 80.
296
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promoted, and compensated less than their taller peers, their gender
overshadows the discrimination they suffer and we tend to overlook it.
All these combined features of height discrimination—the perpetrator’s
lack of intent, the imperceptible harm, the unconventional form (in terms of
perpetrator/victim), and the unlikely domain—render height discrimination
hard to perceive. We fail to see the maltreatment short people often receive,
and when we do, we attribute it to other causes (such as lack of talent,
misfortune, or character flaws). Although, as clearly demonstrated in the
first part of this Article, heightism is at least as common and pervasive as
other forms of discrimination, society does not recognize (“name”) the
biases against short people as discrimination, and it fails to address them.
Indeed, scholars have pointed out, “naming” an injurious experience is
perhaps the most difficult stage in the transformation of such an experience
to a legal dispute,302 and in height discrimination the “naming” stage does
not take place.
IV. ADDRESSING HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION
So, should the legal system give up on height discrimination? Should
society accept height biases as a given and allow the mistreatment of short
individuals to continue without providing a remedy?
Despite the “negative” experiences in Michigan and other
jurisdictions,303 I maintain that height discrimination should be addressed.
As I have argued, heightism is morally wrong, and it should not be dismissed
as just a funny anecdote. Like the current protected forms of discrimination,
it demeans its victims, it regards them as unequal, and it harms their
wellbeing—all due to no fault of their own. Given this moral standpoint, the
legal system cannot ignore heightism. It should offer victims of height
discrimination a remedy and pave way to social change. The way I suggest
height discrimination should be addressed, however, is different from the
model adopted in Michigan and in other places. I suggest focusing on the
naming of heightism, rather than just providing a potential cause of action,
which is hardly used anyway.
The importance of “naming” as an initial step to social change can be
demonstrated through the experience of women’s battle against sexual
harassment.304 The practice of sexual harassment is hardly a recent
phenomenon. Women have suffered unwanted sexual advances from their
male superiors for centuries, but the practice has become a basis for legal
302

Felstiner et al., supra note 245, at 635.
See text accompanying notes 223-43 (emphasizing that even in jurisdictions that provide a
remedy for height discrimination, it is often not utilized).
304
See Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 1-3 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing
the importance of unifying women’s experiences with sexual harassment and naming it discrimination).
303
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action (sexual harassment law) only since the 1970s.305 As Wendy Pollack
describes, prior to the 1970s, “sexual harassment simply happened to
women.”306 Each event was isolated, and the phenomenon did not even have
a proper name. The unwelcome sexual advances were considered each
victim’s personal matter, and there was no connection between the
harassments and the broader phenomenon of gender hierarchy. 307 This
perception changed with the rise of the modern women’s liberation
movements. With the advent of these movements, women started sharing
their experiences.308 They discovered that the unwelcomed sexual advances
they suffer in the work place are common, and that the supposedly individual
and isolated incidents of harassment are actually a broad and in many senses
political phenomenon.309 They began developing a sense of community
(“sisterhood”), and raised women’s and society’s awareness to the fact that
women should not have to put up with such behavior. As Catharine
MacKinnon explains: “Through consciousness raising, women grasp[ed] the
collective reality of women’s condition . . . .”310 The consciousness raising,
or in other words the “naming” of sexual harassment as a sociopolitical
phenomenon, in turn led to a social change.311 Sexual harassment was
labeled an illegal sex discrimination act, and the practice of subjecting an
employee to unwelcomed sexual advances became prohibited under Title
VII.312
If we want heightist practices also to be eliminated, or at least reduced,
the same pattern should be adopted.313 Society must first raise the awareness
and recognize heightism as a problem (be conscious about height
discrimination), and only then, either through market practices314 or, as in
305

Prior to the 1970s, courts did not view sexual harassment in the workplace as an employment
issue or a sex issue. It was perceived as a personal matter and was dealt, in the rare cases where women
had the courage to complain, as part of rape law or tort law. See id. at 4–8 (explaining how many lawyers
and activists began a movement against sexual harassment).
306
Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 41 (1990).
307
Id.
308
Elvia R. Arriola, “What’s the Big Deal?” Women in the New York City Construction Industry
and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-85, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 30 (1990).
309
Id. at 30; Pollack, supra note 306, at 39.
310
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory,
7 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 536 (1982). Even the term “sexual harassment” itself is the product
of a “consciousness-raising session” conducted in Cornell University. See Siegel, supra note 304, at 8.
311
Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1234-35 (1993).
312
Siegel, supra note 304, at 8–11.
313
Felstiner and his team demonstrate the importance of naming through the example of asbestos
litigation. Felstiner et al., supra note 245, at 635. They explain that asbestosis has become a recognized
disease and a basis for compensation claims only “when shipyard workers stopped taking for granted that
they would have trouble breathing after ten years . . . and came to view their condition as a problem.”
314
See sources cited supra note 190 (discussing economic debate regarding the desirability of
anti-discrimination legislation).
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the case of sexual harassment, through legal remedies, can we begin a move
towards a change.
Recognizing heightism as a social problem (naming height
discrimination), however, may be challenging due to the special features of
height discrimination. It is difficult for three reasons. First, as previously
explained, heightism does not fit the behavioral patterns our brain is
accustomed to identify as discrimination.315 We easily attribute height
discriminatory behaviors to benign factors, such as the victim’s lack of
talent, misfortune, or character flaws, and we perceive or ascribe nothing
wrong with the employer’s behavior.316 But, if there is nothing wrong with
the employer’s behavior, then there is also no reason to initiate a change. A
short person’s rejection or reduced pay is not a social problem, but rather an
isolated personal experience—not even necessarily associated with the
victim’s height. Second, as opposed to gender or racial and religious groups,
short people are unorganized.317 The short statured do not see themselves as
a community, and there is no “brotherhood” among them. Since short people
are uncoordinated, they are also unaware that the discrimination they suffer
(even when perceived) is common to other short individuals. Injurious
discrimination patterns are not shared, and heightism is viewed as a unique
and sporadic experience, rather than as the widespread and pervasive social
phenomenon that it actually is. As we know from the feminist movements
(with regard to sexual harassment), sharing common experiences is key to
understanding and naming a phenomenon as a social problem,318 and with
respect to heightism it is simply not done. Third, with respect to height
discrimination, there are no interest groups that raise the public’s awareness
to the phenomenon.319 Although there are dozens of empirical academic
studies proving that heightism exists,320 these studies are rarely brought to
the general public’s attention. There is no underlying force, such as the
women’s movements in the 1970s, that brings the data to public attention,
and that points out that short people are discriminated against just like other
protected groups. As a result, heightism remains unnoticed, and a short
315
See sources cited supra notes 263–66 (describing the psychological underpinnings of
discrimination).
316
Id.
317
See Riordan et al., supra note 293, at 37, 43 (discussing demographic distinctions of
ingroup/outgroup differentiation but failing to mention height as a possible basis on which groups could
be formed).
318
See MacKinnon, supra note 310, at 536 (describing the feminist movement as dependent on a
collective understanding and rejection of objectification).
319
See Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2020) (displaying a list of all registered interest groups that lobby the federal government, which
includes no interest groups that advocate for short-statured individuals).
320
See Scott Griffiths et al., The Tall and the Short of It: An Investigation of Height Ideals, Height
Preferences, Height Dissatisfaction, Heightism, and Height-Related Quality of Life Impairment Among
Sexual Minority Men, 23 BODY IMAGE 146, 147 (2017) (chronicling the history of empirical interest in
heightism).
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individual does not know the phenomenon exists (cannot name the problem),
even if he directly suffers from it.
This is where I believe the law needs to step in. It should collectivize the
individual experiences of the short-statured, and through the collectivization
process, the gravity and pervasiveness of the problem will be recognized. It
should bring height discrimination to our collective legal consciousness and
make employers and employees aware that they are liable to discriminate or
to be discriminated against on the basis of height. This should be done
through the provision of information. If the individual stories are added up
to create a statistical database, which will be published and readily available
to the public, the naming of height discrimination will more likely take
place. Short employees will be able to perceive the discrimination, because
they will know what to look for.
My suggestion is, therefore, as follows: employees in public
organizations or in large firms will indicate their height to their employer at
the start of their employment. The employer will collect the information and
will be obligated to calculate the correlation between the employees’ height
and various variables. The employer will then publish an annual report,
which will provide information on the following issues: the number of
employees in the organization/firm below average height;321 the distribution
of height in each rank in the organization/firm (what is the height of
employees in each rank);322 and the connection between employees’ salaries
and their height—whether taller employees indeed earn more. The report
shall not include names or any other details on individual employees, but
will include anonymous statistical information. It will be distributed to
employees and included in the firm’s financial reports (to the extent the firm
is obligated to publish such reports). If the reports indicate that height
discrimination exists in the organization, then education and training for
managers and employees about height discrimination should accompany the
reports. The training will increase awareness to heightism and will help
managers and employees to change their behavior.
This mechanism for reducing height discrimination is supported by
research.323 Psychological literature indicates that awareness of implicit
biases can go a long way towards reducing those biases, because awareness
321

This piece of data will show whether there is discrimination in hiring.
This piece of data will show the connection between height and promotions.
323
For a survey on the research on the reduction of implicit biases, see PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR
EDUCATION
(2012)
[hereinafter
RESOURCES
FOR
EDUCATION],
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.259.1089&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
For
a
summary of strategies designed to reduce implicit biases, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING
COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS (2012),
http://www.iowanebraskanaacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/implicitbias.pdf
[hereinafter
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS].
322
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motivates an inner change.324 When people realize that they have acted
prejudicially, and if the values they hold oppose such prejudiced conduct,
then they feel motivated to engage in prejudice-reducing practices.325 They
tend to feel guilty about their biased responses, and their guilt prompts a shift
in their behavioral patterns. In one study, for example, white subjects were
presented a multiracial series of faces. After the presentation, the subjects
were told (falsely)—that they reacted very positively to white faces,
moderately positively to Asian faces, and negatively to black faces.326 After
being given the bogus responses, most subjects reported an elevated feeling
of guilt.327 These subjects were subsequently more willing to engage in
prejudice-reducing behaviors and to change their supposedly racial
practices.328 Correspondingly, Margo Monteith shows that people who
generally condemn racial behaviors (“low prejudiced”) have self-regulatory
mechanisms that facilitate the inhibition of prejudiced responses.329 When
low prejudiced people are presented with evidence that they have engaged
in prejudiced practices (of which they were unaware), they are willing to
undertake self-regulatory efforts in order to prevent future prejudiced
responses.330 Devine and her team view implicit biases as a habit.331 They
developed a habit-breaking intervention which included feedback,
education, and training to help people eliminate their biases.332 Their study
showed using these practices succeeds in reduction of implicit biases and
produces long term positive effects.333 Nilanjana Dasgupta summarizes the
research on awareness to implicit biases as follows:
[E]ven when stereotypes and prejudices are automatically
activated, whether or not they will bias behavior depends on
how aware people are of the possibility of bias, how motivated
324

STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS, supra note 323, at 5 (explaining that
awareness is crucial to combatting implicit bias).
325
Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice
Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1268 (2012).
326
David M. Amodio et al., A Dynamic Model of Guilt: Implications for Motivation and
Self-Regulation in the Context of Prejudice, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 524, 526–27 (2007).
327
Id. at 527.
328
Id.
329
Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for Progress in
Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 470 (1993).
330
Id. See also Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1235 (2007)
(detailing how the authors studied the effects of implicit racial biases on the treatment physicians suggest
to white and black patients, showing that generally, implicit bias had a significant effect on the suggested
treatment, but the effect on the treatment dramatically reduced when the physicians were aware that
implicit bias was the focus of the research).
331
Devine et al., supra note 325, at 1268.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 1276.
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they are to correct potential bias, and how much control they
have over the specific behavior.334
According to these parameters, raising awareness to height
discrimination may be particularly useful. Perhaps, as opposed to other
forms of discrimination (against women, blacks, Jews, or homosexuals), it
seems that most people do not want to intentionally harm short people.
Usually people do not consciously hate or fear the short-statured, so they
will be more inclined to change their heightist practices. As the research
indicates, awareness is most efficient in changing a prejudiced behavior
when the implicit bias is contrary to the person’s explicit values.
Providing information on height discriminatory practices (via reports)
can thus have a double positive effect. First, it may reduce height prejudice
behaviors. If employers, managers, and co-workers will see the statistics,
they will understand the scope of the height discrimination in their
organization. They might feel guilty about it, and consciously try to control
their automatic preferences for the tall. They may hire more short
individuals, promote them more often, and compensate them better. Even if
the implicit biases remain, their external manifestations will be moderated.
Second, the provided information will raise the consciousness to heightism.
From trees of isolated discrimination events, which are usually not even
attributed to discrimination, the reports will enable us to see the forest. We
will be able to see what the scientific research has already pointed out: that
height discrimination is a pervasive social phenomenon; that it harms a large
portion of the population; and that it is unjust and should be eradicated.
Raising the awareness to heightism, in turn, could have legal
implications. If more people will talk about and fight against height
discrimination, legislators in more jurisdictions will join the battle.
Additional height discrimination statutes may be legislated, which will give
short people more venues to seek remedies. Moreover, and more
importantly, unlike the current situation in Michigan and other local
jurisdictions, height discrimination statutes will be more effective. Due to
the published information in the reports, naming will take place, and when
naming occurs, blaming and claiming can follow.
I do not think that height discrimination will vanish due to the published
information, nor do I think that people’s biases will disappear. I do believe,
however, that as people become more aware of this phenomenon, height
discrimination may decrease. Heightism will, at least, be a recognized
phenomenon, and not something people do without even realizing.

334
Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral
Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 157 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
Height discrimination undoubtedly exists. This Article presented dozens
of studies that show that people have implicit biases against the
short-statured and demonstrates the effects of these biases on short people’s
lives. From employers who do not want to hire short applicants, to
employers who do not promote short employees. From the problems short
people experience in dating and in other social interactions, to the decreased
wages they receive due to their height. As Natalie Angier points out,
heightism “is one of the last accept[ed] prejudices,”335 and it is severe and
pervasive.
Given the proportions of the heightism phenomenon, this Article
examined why it is not properly addressed. Why do the Federal System and
most states not even view it as discrimination, and why, even in jurisdictions
that provide an option for remedy, is the option not used? The answer given
in this Article is “naming.” Height discriminatory practices are not perceived
as illegal disparate treatment discrimination because they do not fit our
mental template of discrimination. The characteristics we usually associate
with discrimination—intentional behavior, clear harm, specific
perpetrator/victim, and specific domains—do not exist in height
discrimination, and so we fail to categorize it as discrimination. The victims
of a height-discriminatory behavior tend to attribute the behavior and its
outcomes to their own character flaws, and the perpetrators and society may
not even notice it. To overcome the naming difficulty, this Article suggests
the provision of information. Information will raise the public’s awareness
to heightism and will help short people understand the nature of the injurious
experiences they undergo. Conscious employers (and people in general) are
less likely to discriminate, and conscious victims are more likely to fight
against the discrimination.
I am not sure the battle will be successful. Implicit biases, certainly those
so deeply ingrained in our brains, are hard to change. I am sure, however,
that the battle is worth fighting. People should not be praised just because
they were born tall, and they should not be demeaned simply because they
were born short. And it is high time we do something about this.

335

Angier, supra note 37 (emphasis added).
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